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THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
Bruce Ackerman∗ 
I.  LECTURE ONE: ARE WE A NATION? 
he telephone rang, and a familiar conversation began: since 1989, 
the State Department had been badgering me to serve on delega-
tions to advise one or another country on its constitutional transition to 
democracy.  I had refused, and refused, and refused: no junketing for 
me, no ignorant professing in front of politicians I did not know on 
countries I barely understood. 
But once again, I heard an earnest midwestern voice at the end of 
the line, speaking self-importantly in the name of the Special Assistant 
to the Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.  This time, 
he assured me, it was going to be completely different. 
The State Department wasn’t asking me to help write a constitution 
in a language I couldn’t read.  It was inviting me to engage in a one-
on-one tutorial with the great Akhil Alfarabi, a master of both the 
European and Islamic legal traditions, who was eager to extend his 
understanding to American constitutional law.  Nothing but mutual 
enlightenment, the cheery voice guaranteed: it was past time to bridge 
the fearsome cavern separating the great legal systems of the world.  
And they were asking only for a week of my time. 
Why not? I asked, and I soon found myself, jetlagged, encountering 
a smiling Alfarabi at an undisclosed location.  After drinking endless 
cups of tea, we began serious conversation where I always begin: with 
the written Constitution, starting from the words “We the People” and 
working our way to the end of the text. 
Alfarabi fulfilled my fondest expectations.  He was a master of the 
art of elaborating profound legal principles out of lapidary texts and 
listened intently as I presented the famous words left behind by the 
American Founding and Reconstruction.  A couple of days of joyful 
conversation passed, and we finally moved into our final lap: the texts 
of the twentieth century.  But Alfarabi was getting impatient, and a bit 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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resentful, at my treating him like a brilliant first-year student.  “How 
about changing roles,” he suggested, “and letting me take the lead in 
interpreting the last few constitutional amendments?” 
Truth to tell, I was a bit doubtful: for all his learning, he didn’t 
have the foggiest idea of American history.  But after all, I didn’t have 
any idea of his country’s history, and that hadn’t stopped us from en-
gaging in some great conversation. 
“Why not?” I asked myself, glimpsing the ghost of John Dewey1 en-
thusiastically nodding his approval: “We have reached the Twenty-First 
Amendment.  What do you think it means?” 
“Well, the year is 1933, and Franklin Roosevelt is coming into office 
— he’s the one who announced the New Deal, no?” 
I nodded enthusiastically, as is my habit, and was greatly relieved to 
learn that the guy knew more about my country’s history than I knew 
of his. 
“And looking at the amendment,” said Akhil, “I can see precisely 
why they call it the New Deal.  I find it deeply regrettable that the 
American people repealed the ban on the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, but as a lawyer it’s obvious that something very new is 
happening: We the People are demanding a sharp cutback in overly 
ambitious federal regulatory schemes.  The larger constitutional princi-
ple is clear: the era of Big Government is over.” Alfarabi spoke with 
confidence, for great lawyers never lack self-confidence. 
Before I could figure out what to say, Akhil was pushing on to the 
next amendment.  “This Twenty-Second Amendment,” he explained 
triumphantly, “only confirms my interpretation.  I see that it was en-
acted when Harry Truman was in the White House — wasn’t he a 
loyal follower of Roosevelt? — and the text makes it clear that the 
People are moving right along in the direction marked by Roosevelt’s 
New Deal.  In 1933, they repudiated Big Government; now they are 
cutting the imperial presidency down to size by limiting incumbents to 
two terms in office.  There can be no doubt about the larger point: 
goodbye Big Government, goodbye imperial presidency — a New Deal 
indeed.” 
He smiled, confident of his mastery of the interpretive techniques I 
had taught him when elaborating the great texts of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  But I paused, once again, before responding, and 
Alfarabi raced ahead. 
As he mumbled something about the District of Columbia, I 
glanced apprehensively at the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, prohibiting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 Or was it my friends Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff?  See BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN 
AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND 
SMALL 115–32 (2003) (suggesting the analytic utility of appreciating potentially symmetric situa-
tions). 
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the states and the national government from imposing poll taxes in fed-
eral elections.  This is the only modern text that hints at the civil rights 
era’s preoccupation with racial justice.  Would Alfarabi catch the 
point? 
Yes, I’m happy to report, nothing escaped his bright eye and inquir-
ing mind, but his reading emphasized the plain meaning of the text.  
The amendment marks the first time in American history that the Con-
stitution explicitly condemned wealth discrimination, and Alfarabi took 
this ball and ran with it: “If the government can’t charge a fee when it 
comes to voting, surely it can’t burden other fundamental rights of citi-
zenship.  So the key question raised by Twenty-Four is obvious: how to 
define the range of basic interests protected against invidious economic 
discrimination?” 
“Never thought of that,” I muttered, but Akhil was already moving 
on, and when he encountered the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, guaran-
teeing the right to vote for eighteen-year-olds, he began to connect the 
dots in the great American fashion: “What,” he asked, “is the common 
thread linking the ban on voting discrimination against teenagers with 
the ban on voting discrimination against poor people?”2 
His eyes darted forward to see whether the remaining amendments 
contained the answer, but he was shocked to find that he had arrived 
at the end of his journey.  Thirty-five years have passed since the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment was enacted in 1971, and the American peo-
ple have added absolutely nothing to their written text — unless you 
count an odd little provision, initially proposed in 1789, forgotten for 
almost two centuries, and then revived and ratified by the states in 
1992, forbidding members of Congress from immediately raising their 
own salaries.3 
“Hmm,” said Alfarabi, “I guess nothing much has happened in 
America since the teenagers’ historic struggle for constitutional rights.  
Nevertheless, I am now in a position to formulate the basic question 
left by the modern era of development: how can a weak federal gov-
ernment, with a chastened presidency, do justice to the People’s repu-
diation of wealth discrimination and its ringing endorsement of teenage 
rights?” 
“That’s not quite how we Americans think about our twentieth-
century legacy,” I said gently. 
“Really?” said Alfarabi, “where have I gone wrong?” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (advocating a 
holistic approach to textual interpretation). 
 3 See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 101, 101–08 (1994) (discussing the problematic validity of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment). 
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“In taking these amendments so seriously and looking upon them as 
the source of large new principles.” 
“But that’s precisely what you Americans always do.  The First 
Amendment, you explained, doesn’t explicitly guarantee ‘freedom of 
association,’ but you derive this right from the principles underlying 
the written text.  Sometimes you call it a penumbra, sometimes you call 
it an emanation, sometimes — as in the case of ‘freedom of association’ 
— you almost forget that the words aren’t in the First Amendment.  
But you do it all the time with your ancient texts, and that’s just what 
I’ve been doing with your modern amendments.  Aren’t they even 
more important, since they were passed more recently?” 
“A good question, but no American asks it.” 
“That’s curious,” said Alfarabi.  “What accounts for such blind-
ness?” 
“Maybe your brilliant interpretations suggest a paradoxical answer: 
if we treated recent amendments as important statements of principle, 
we would be falsifying the great truths about the constitutional 
achievements of the twentieth century.  You see, the New Deal did not 
represent a repudiation of big government, but its sweeping popular af-
firmation.  And the civil rights era revolutionized America’s commit-
ment to racial equality and wasn’t centrally concerned with discrimina-
tion against the poor or the young.” 
“You may say anything you like, my dear Professor Ackerman, but 
if you will forgive me, you seem to be making all this up out of thin air.  
With the greatest respect, it is simply impossible to read the text to 
support your claims.” 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
A funny thing happened to Americans on the way to the twenty-
first century.  We have lost our ability to write down our new constitu-
tional commitments in the old-fashioned way.  This is no small problem 
for a country that imagines itself living under a written Constitution. 
Seventy-five years of false notes and minor chords, culminating in a 
symphony of silence — and the twenty-first century will be no differ-
ent.  Simply look around you.  We are now in the midst of great de-
bates about abortion and religion, about federalism and the war powers 
of the presidency.  But nobody expects a constitutional amendment to 
resolve any of these issues — instead, we see only symbolic gestures on 
matters like flag burning and gay marriage. 
When it comes to serious business, movement-activists in the Re-
publican Party are trying to change our Constitution by following the 
higher lawmaking script elaborated during the New Deal.  They are 
looking for brilliant jurists who could emulate Justices Black, Frank-
furter, and Jackson in writing landmark opinions that sweep away the 
law of the preceding era and create a brave new world for the constitu-
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tional future.  If they have their way, Republican Presidents will add 
right-thinking judges to the Roberts Court until it transforms Roe v. 
Wade4 into the Lochner v. New York5 of the twenty-first century — the 
great anti-precedent stigmatizing an entire era of constitutional law.6  It 
is judicial revolution, not formal amendment, that serves as one of the 
great pathways for fundamental change marked out by the living Con-
stitution.  Despite their insistence on the primacy of the written text, 
movement-Republicans are not misled by their own rhetoric when it 
comes to the serious business of transforming constitutional politics into 
constitutional law.7 
But judicial revolution isn’t the only way to transform constitu-
tional values in the modern era.  A second great pathway involves the 
enactment of landmark statutes that express the new regime’s basic 
principles: the Social Security Act,8 for example, or the Civil Rights 
Acts of the 1960s.9  Once again, the Republican Right is agitating for 
similar landmarks, and as in the New Deal, the Supreme Court is re-
sisting its initial efforts, striking down, for example, a recent statutory 
ban on “partial birth abortions.”10  But if movement-Republicans keep 
on winning elections on highly ideological platforms, the Court will re-
treat, just as it did during the New Deal.11  If the Republican Party 
doesn’t sustain its control over the presidency and Congress,12 the push 
for landmark statutes will subside, and the status quo will endure. 
Whatever the future may hold, don’t expect big changes through 
formal amendments.  We the People can’t seem to crank out messages 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 6 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 781, 788–90 (2000) (discussing the canonization of Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent). 
 7 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Con-
stitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 (2006) (arguing that originalism “provides its proponents 
a compelling language in which to seek constitutional change through adjudication and politics”).  
 8 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
 9 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.  
 10 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).   
 11 Conservative Republicans in Congress responded to Carhart with the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201.  A challenge to this statute was pending be-
fore the Court at the time of these Lectures.  See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., v. Gon-
zales, 445 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).  If a majority upholds the 
constitutionality of this relatively narrow effort to circumscribe the doctor-patient relationship, its 
decision will encourage the right-to-life movement to push for a far broader congressional assault 
on Roe v. Wade.  So long as conservative Republicans remain in control of Congress and the presi-
dency, a landmark statute repudiating Roe remains a distinct possibility, catalyzing the confronta-
tion with a (changing) Court envisioned in the text. 
 12 I wrote these lines in the summer of 2006, and I delivered them the following October.  I will 
defer a discussion of the 2006 elections to another time. 
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in the way described by Article V of our Constitution.  Our writing 
machine has gone the way of the typewriter.  But why? 
There are three possibilities: there is something wrong with the ma-
chine, something wrong with the American people, or nothing wrong 
with either.  Conventional wisdom gives the happy answer: it’s a good 
thing that formal amendment is so hard; otherwise, the Constitution 
would become a mess, full of details signifying little. 
The happy answer is half-right: yes, it should be hard to amend the 
Constitution, but there are plenty of different ways to make things 
hard.  The question is whether the Founders’ way makes sense. 
My answer is “yes and no”: it did make sense for them, but it no 
longer makes sense for us.  After two centuries of development, Amer-
ica’s political identity is at war with the system of constitutional revi-
sion left by the Framers.  We understand ourselves today as Americans 
first and Californians second.  But the amendment system was written 
for a people who thought of themselves primarily as New Yorkers or 
Georgians.  We have become a nation-centered People stuck with a 
state-centered system of formal amendment. 
This disjunction between state-centered form and nation-centered 
substance serves as the dynamic force behind the living Constitution.  
Although Americans may worship the text, they have not allowed it to 
stand in the way of their rising national consciousness.  Since the Civil 
War, they have given decisive and self-conscious support to national 
politicians and their judicial appointees as they have repeatedly 
adapted state-centered institutions, and constitutional texts, to express 
national purposes.  The great challenge for constitutional law is to  
develop historically sensitive categories for understanding these  
developments. 
Alfarabi is a creature of my own imagination,13 but there are many 
flesh-and-blood thinkers and doers throughout the world who actually 
believe that Americans are operating on the basis of the formal Consti-
tution.  This has caused all sorts of mischief as they use the world he-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Alfarabi, by the way, was a great Islamic thinker who spent most of his life in tenth-century 
Baghdad.  His main project was the integration of Greek philosophy into Islamic thought, but he 
was also an important music theorist and performer.  For a recent introduction to his political 
thought, see PHILIPPE VALLAT, FARABI ET L’ÉCOLE D’ALEXANDRIE: DES PRÉMISSES DE LA 
CONNAISSANCE À LA PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE (2004).  Any similarity between the historical 
Alfarabi and my imaginary character is strictly coincidental.  
  This isn’t true when it comes to the not-so-subtle reference to my friend Akhil Amar — 
though his views of the latter-day amendments are far from those I attribute to Alfarabi, his inter-
pretive methods display certain similarities (and differences).  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).  Beyond the particular amendments and 
with regard to the larger question, Professor Amar has yet to deal squarely with the constitutional 
status of the great twentieth-century transformations raised by my imaginary dialogue.  He is, 
however, planning a book dealing with the unwritten constitution, which will clarify his position 
on this central matter.  
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gemon as a model for their own constitutional arrangements — the fi-
asco in Iraq is only the last in a line of formalist failures.  Yet it is one 
thing to fool the rest of the world; quite another, to fool ourselves.  We 
won’t be able to define, let alone resolve, our fundamental constitu-
tional problems until we confront the long and complex transformation 
in American political identity that has reduced our written Constitution 
into a radically incomplete statement of our higher law. 
Begin by seeing the Framers as they saw themselves.  Fifty-five 
men went to Philadelphia, but only thirty-nine signed the document.14  
Almost all had forged continent-wide bonds during and after the Revo-
lutionary War.  Time and again, they had shown that they were pre-
pared to die for the Union.  Compared to the average citizen, they were 
revolutionary nationalists, and they proved it when they came out of 
their secret sessions in Philadelphia to propose a new Constitution in 
the name of We the People of the United States.  Although the Articles 
of Confederation required all thirteen states to approve any change, the 
Framers declared that nine states would suffice to begin new political 
life under their Constitution.  Going further, they cut the existing state 
governments out of the ratification process, demanding that each state 
hold an extraordinary ratifying convention unknown to its constitu-
tional law.15 
To appreciate the magnitude of these moves, suppose that the recent 
Constitutional Convention in Europe had taken similar steps.  Like the 
American Articles of Confederation, the current treaties establishing 
the European Union require the unanimous consent of all member 
states for any revision.16  And like the New World of the eighteenth 
century, the Old World of the twenty-first is characterized by a  
weak citizen attachment to the Union and a strong commitment to na-
tion-states.17  The Brussels Convention, moreover, was full of proud 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 
514 (1995). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union art. 48, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 
O.J. (C 325) 5, 31.  Current law is based on consistent practice from the very beginning of Euro-
pean integration.  See Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community art. 204, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169. 
 17 See, e.g., OPTEM S.A.R.L., PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A QUALITATIVE 
STUDY OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TO AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN THE 15 MEMBER STATES AND THE 9 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 36–52 (2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/studies/optem-report_en.pdf (indicating relative commitment 
to nation and the EU throughout the Continent).  As in the America of the eighteenth century, the 
citizens of different states vary in their affiliation with the Union; broadly speaking, commitment 
to the EU becomes weaker as one moves north and west.  See id.  These basic trends continue to 
the present day.  Cf. OPTEM, THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: 
QUALITATIVE STUDY IN THE 25 MEMBER STATES, at  22 (2006), available at http://ec.europa. 
eu/public_opinion/quali/ql_futur_en.pdf (discussing Europeans’ fears that the EU could impair 
national identity). 
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invocations of the example that had been set at Philadelphia two cen-
turies before.18 
Suppose, then, that Brussels had invoked the Philadelphia prece-
dent and declared that the proposed Constitution would come into 
force when ratified by slightly more than two-thirds of the member 
states — say, eighteen out of twenty-five to match Philadelphia’s nine 
out of thirteen.19  Suppose further that Brussels had followed Philadel-
phia in ignoring the states’ ratification procedures — insisting, for ex-
ample, that Germany hold a referendum on ratification, regardless of 
what the German Basic Law might say on the matter.20 
I could go on and on in describing the revolutionary character of 
the American Founding,21 but I’ve already said enough to suggest that 
the talk at Brussels of the Philadelphia Convention was idle chatter.  
Even the imperious Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Convention’s chair-
man, never seriously considered following George Washington in lead-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See, e.g., Thomas Ferenczi & Arnaud Leparmentier, La Convention Propose une Constitu-
tion à 450 Millions d’Européens, LE MONDE, June 14, 2003, available at http://www.lemonde. 
fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-323916,0.html (“Nous pouvons nous comparer à la convention de 
Philadelphie . . . .”  (quoting Eurodeputy Alain Lamassoure) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  A 
regular commentator on the movement toward a closer Union, writing under the name Publius, 
critically appraises the comparisons with Philadelphia in his Letter 27.  Publius, European Letter 
27 (Feb. 2003), http://www.euraction.org/lett/N27.htm. 
 19 When the Convention began work, there were only fifteen members of the Union, but ten 
new states joined on May 1, 2004.  See Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithua-
nia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slo-
venia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, Sept. 23, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 236) 17.  
When the new states became full members, their ratifications were required before the new Consti-
tution could come into effect.  See Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council para. 3 
(Dec. 12–13, 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/enlargement/docs/pres_ 
conclusions_copenhagen_en.pdf. 
 20 The Brussels Convention made no effort to impose a single ratifying procedure on all mem-
bers of the Union, allowing each to ratify under its own constitutional procedures.  Treaty Estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe art. IV-447(1), Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C310) 1, 191.  Some 
states have chosen a referendum; others, ratification by parliament.  At present, fifteen states 
have ratified, see EUROPA, Constitution: Interactive Map, http://europa.eu/constitution/ 
ratification_en.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007), and if the ground rules had only required adoption 
by three-fourths of the states of the Union, it would have been politically feasible to obtain three or 
four more yes votes without taking the extraordinary measures adopted by the Federalists to win 
nine assents from the original thirteen states, see Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 14, at 529–37 
(detailing Federalist tactics in various state ratifying conventions). 
  When the French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitution, there was no inclination by the 
Union’s leaders to rethink their commitment to unanimity.  They simply extended the ratification 
deadline as they pondered their next moves.  See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European 
Council paras. 42–49 (June 15–16, 2006), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ 
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf. 
 21 See generally Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 14. 
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ing a frontal assault on state sovereignty in the name of the rising  
Union.22 
Yet this centralizing breakthrough was absolutely essential to the 
Philadelphia Convention’s success.  As in the cases of France and the 
Netherlands today, North Carolina and Rhode Island flatly rejected the 
proposed Constitution of 1787, and they continued to stay out of the 
Union even as President Washington and the First Congress began op-
erating in 1789.23  If unanimity had been the rule, the vetoes entered by 
these two states would have set back the Federalist campaign for “a 
more perfect Union” for a decade, perhaps forever. 
The Founding Federalists were revolutionary nationalists, but they 
were also realists.  They knew they couldn’t get away with a ratifica-
tion or amendment process that was entirely nation-centered — say, a 
nationwide referendum that would have required sixty percent ap-
proval of their initiative by all Americans who went to the polls to 
vote.24  At this foundational level, the Convention built a state-centered 
federation in which national institutions could merely propose, but not 
ratify, constitutional initiatives, leaving it up to a supermajority of the 
states to make the final decision. 
Only the bloodbath of Civil War gave birth to a stronger national 
identity.  For the first time in American history, the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment declared forthrightly that national citizenship 
was primary and state citizenship was secondary.  With these words, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 Without engaging in any significant discussion, the Convention simply projected the past 
practice of seeking unanimity onto its proposed Constitution.  See generally Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, supra note 20, pt. I, at 11–40 (detailing areas requiring unanimity). 
 23 Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 14, at 537–39. 
 24 As Marshall explained in his high-nationalist opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819): 
The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State legisla-
tures.  But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without 
obligation, or pretensions to it.  It was reported to the then existing Congress of the 
United States, with a request that it might “be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legislature, 
for their assent and ratification.”  This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the 
Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was submitted to 
the people.  They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act safely, effec-
tively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in Convention.  It is true, they as-
sembled in their several States — and where else should they have assembled?  No politi-
cal dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the 
States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass.  Of conse-
quence, when they act, they act in their States.  But the measures they adopt do not, on 
that account, cease to be the measures of the people [of the United States] themselves, or 
become the measures of the State governments. 
Id. at 403 (emphasis added).  
  Two centuries later, such “wild political dreams” seem a perfectly plausible way for Ameri-
cans to break the veto granted to five percent of the population by Article V of the 1787 Constitu-
tion.  See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 403–18 (1998) (propos-
ing a nation-centered process of amendment to complement Article V).  
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the Republicans aimed to transform the Federalists’ state-centered fed-
eration into a nation-centered federation.  But this revolution, it turned 
out, was merely a paper triumph: it would take a very long time before 
it would become a functioning part of the living Constitution.  For 
starters, the Republican Congress during Reconstruction failed to con-
front, let alone resolve, the full institutional implications of its paper 
assertion of the primacy of American citizenship.  It was content to 
stretch the state-centered Constitution of the Founders beyond its 
breaking point to achieve the Republicans’ short-term ends, without 
creating adequate nation-centered structures for future constitutional 
development. 
The first crisis came when the Southern states refused to ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby depriving it of the three-fourths ma-
jority required by Article V.  Instead of accepting defeat, Congress re-
sponded with the use of force — destroying the dissenting state gov-
ernments, reconstructing new ones, and unconstitutionally keeping the 
reconstructed states out of the Union until they gave their consent to 
the new nationalizing amendments.25 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 I describe the pervasive legal problems in 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 99–252.  Profes-
sor Amar tries to sweep all these difficulties under the rug in sixteen pages of his America’s Consti-
tution: A Biography.  See AMAR, supra note 13, at 364–80.  Relying heavily on Senator Charles 
Sumner’s interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of “republican government,” Professor 
Amar argues that the Republican Congress was justified in excluding representatives from the all-
white Southern governments created under the supervision of Andrew Johnson.  Blacks in these 
states composed at least a quarter of the entire population, and on Senator Sumner’s view, a state 
could not disenfranchise such a large fraction of its free population without losing it status as a 
“republican government.”  See id. at 368–76. 
  But Senator Sumner’s views were self-consciously repudiated by the Reconstruction Con-
gress in framing the Fourteenth Amendment.  Professor Amar barely notes that the amendment’s 
second section expressly deals with the problem of black disenfranchisement, reducing the size of a 
state’s House delegation in “proportion” to the disenfranchised black share of “male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2.  This provision is flatly inconsistent with the Sumner/Amar theory, which would deny all 
congressional representation to the Southern states.   
  Professor Amar’s preference for Senator Sumner’s theory over the plain meaning of the 
amendment is especially remarkable given his general embrace of textualist methods of interpreta-
tion.  And yet even this sweeping methodological swerve doesn’t get Professor Amar to his destina-
tion.  Even if Senator Sumner’s theory trumps the text, it must confront some uncomfortable facts: 
in 1868, the Reconstruction Congress refused to admit Congressmen and Senators from individual 
Southern states even after these states admitted blacks to the suffrage, and even after Congress ex-
pressly found that they qualified as “republican governments.”  Indeed, a Southern state’s ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment was not enough.  Congress required the representatives of the 
early ratifying states to wait outside its doors until enough of their fellow Southern governments 
endorsed the amendment so as to provide the necessary three-fourths majority under Article V.  
See First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867); see also 2 ACKERMAN, 
supra note 24, at 231 (analyzing constitutional problems).  This last move was flat-out unconstitu-
tional, and neither Amar, nor anybody else, has ever tried to justify it — preferring to ignore the 
facts altogether.  See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN 
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These revolutionary activities led to short-run success, but they re-
quired such enormous political energy that they exhausted the constitu-
tional ambitions of the Republican Party and the American people.  
Once the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified by the 
reconstructed Southern governments, the country’s political attention 
moved elsewhere, and nobody was prepared to consider seriously 
whether the new nation-centered understanding of American citizen-
ship required a nation-centered system of constitutional revision. 
The same thing happened in response to the presidential election 
crisis of 1876.  The dispute between Hayes and Tilden was resolved, 
once again, through extraconstitutional means without confronting the 
larger question it raised: did it still make sense for the country to elect 
its primary national leader through the fiction of a state-centered Elec-
toral College?26 
And the same thing happened in 1873, when the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases27 transformed the great promise of 
the new Citizenship Clauses into a mockery, virtually reading these 
new provisions out of the Constitution.  It would take much more than 
a piece of paper to make the primacy of the American nation into a liv-
ing constitutional reality. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 54 (1955) (“The legislative history of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is 
not enlightening, and the history of its ratification is not edifying.”  (emphasis added)). 
  Professor Amar’s reliance on Senator Sumner’s extreme theories simply bears no relationship 
to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment or to the prevailing congressional understandings of the 
time.  Worse yet, his Sumnerian approach also trivializes the Fifteenth Amendment.  On the Sum-
ner/Amar view, this amendment was not necessary to guarantee Southern blacks their voting 
rights, since depriving them of the franchise would immediately disqualify them under the “repub-
lican government” clause.  Instead, the Fifteenth Amendment would have had the sole purpose of 
protecting black voting rights in the North, where blacks comprised less than twenty-five percent 
of the adult population.  See Richard Primus, In the Beginnings, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2006, 
at 27, 29–30 (reviewing AMAR, supra note 13) (commenting on the arbitrariness of the Sum-
ner/Amar twenty-five percent cutoff between republicanism and oligarchy).  But the text of the 
Fifteenth Amendment contains no such limitations, and the Framers of the amendment certainly 
thought they were “cement[ing] the political rights and power of blacks in the South.”  
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 94 (2000); see also WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 49 (1965).  
Once again, Professor Amar’s embrace of Senator Sumner’s theories leads him to ignore the most 
obvious features of the Constitution’s text and history.  
  Instead of ignoring the facts surrounding the proposal and ratification of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, it is more profitable to reflect on the underlying reasons why the Republicans in 
Congress were obliged to distort the federalist forms of Article V in their desperate effort to vali-
date the nationalist substance of their new amendments.  See infra pp. 1766–71. 
 26 See generally 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Supp. 1988).  
After dithering for a decade, Congress finally enacted a statute that merely patched the old system 
in ways that haunt us still.  See Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts 
Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 640–43 (2004) (discussing the Electoral Count Act 
of 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373). 
 27 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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Too bad for us.  If the Civil War generation had followed through, 
Americans would have been in a better position to confront the great 
crises of the twentieth century.  At various points, we have been in dire 
need of nation-centered systems of constitutional revision, presidential 
selection, and citizenship entitlement. 
But there was a very good reason why the nineteenth century didn’t 
help us out.  Despite the brave words of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Americans of that time still remained profoundly uncertain in their 
commitment to the primacy of the nation.  Everybody recognized that 
secession was no longer in the cards, but it would require the great 
events of the twentieth century before ordinary Americans unequivo-
cally put the nation first in their political identities.28 
The First World War, followed by the Great Depression, followed 
by the Second World War, impressed an entire generation with the need 
to address the great questions of war, peace, and economic welfare on 
the national level.  The sense of American community became stronger 
with the next generation’s struggle for civil rights at home and liberal 
democracy abroad.  And it has been reinforced once again by Septem-
ber 11th. 
This deepening political consciousness was supported by broader 
transformations in social and cultural life.  A century ago, America re-
mained a European settler-republic looking to the Old World for cul-
tural leadership and struggling for recognition as an equal to the Great 
Powers of Europe.  Now, America speaks to the world in its own dis-
tinctive accents — attracting and repelling, but very much the great 
cultural force of the age.  America may not be a very civilized place, 
but it is a civilization.  And its inhabitants find themselves at the center 
of revolutions in transportation, communications, education, and busi-
ness, which combine to teach one great message: although you may be 
living in Montana today, you or your children may be making a life in 
Florida or Ohio the day after tomorrow.  And if you do put down roots 
elsewhere, you will find that, despite regional variations, they speak 
American out there. 
No need to exaggerate.  I don’t suggest that Americans think of 
themselves as citizens of a unitary nation-state on the model of, say, 
nineteenth-century France.  We remain Pennsylvanians or Oregonians 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 Professor Robert Wiebe, who devoted much of his life to the subject, remarks: “Contrary to 
later myths, the Civil War strengthened regional far more than comprehensive loyalties.  Union 
referred to a constitutional doctrine, to the winning side in the war, not the whole United States.”  
ROBERT H. WIEBE, WHO WE ARE: A HISTORY OF POPULAR NATIONALISM 92 (2002).  On 
Wiebe’s view, the late nineteenth century marked the transition in popular consciousness toward 
more national self-understandings.  See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–
1920, at 133–63 (1967).  This nationalizing dynamic has been intensified by the communications 
and transportation revolutions, as well as the wars and crises, of the twentieth century.   
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as well as Americans, but the textual promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has finally become a living reality: we are Americans first.  
And as the priority of national citizenship has become a fixture of the 
living Constitution, the inadequacy of other state-centered forms in-
scribed in the text, and unchanged since the Founding, has become a 
very serious problem. 
This is the underlying point of my fabulous conversation with Al-
farabi.  Since he is blissfully unaware of the living Constitution, he 
supposes that the official amendments express the key changes in 
America’s constitutional identity during the twentieth century. 
His is a perfectly natural assumption.  It just doesn’t happen to be 
true.  As a consequence, his interpretations are eccentric because every 
American intuitively recognizes that the modern amendments tell a 
very, very small part of the big constitutional story of the twentieth 
century — and that we have to look elsewhere to understand the rest. 
But where?  A blur of legal landmarks whiz by in the collective 
consciousness: the Social Security Act and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,29 the Civil Rights Acts and Griswold v. Connecticut30 — the list 
could go on and on.  Whichever cases and landmark statutes you might 
or might not add, I am pretty certain of one thing: all the texts you 
propose will have been produced by national, not state, institutions, as 
befits the constitutional conclusions reached by We the People of the 
United States. 
The trouble comes when we compare the cases and landmark stat-
utes on our lists.  Mine might contain the Administrative Procedure 
Act,31 but yours might not; yours might include Roe v. Wade, but oth-
ers emphatically disagree.  Is there any way to resolve these disputes, 
besides pounding on the table with increasing vehemence?  Is it possi-
ble to elaborate criteria, rooted in basic constitutional principles, that 
would allow lawyers and judges to separate the wheat from the chaff 
in a disciplined fashion? 
This is the central problem raised in these Lectures.  To state the 
problem crisply, begin with the idea of an official constitutional canon 
— the body of texts that conventional legal theory places at the very 
center of the legal culture’s self-understanding.  In America today, the 
official canon is composed of the 1787 Constitution and its subsequent 
formal amendments.  At present, however, there is a yawning gap be-
tween this official canon and the nation-centered self-understanding of 
the American people.  The profession has been trying to fill this gap 
with an operational canon — as I shall call it — that promotes land-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 30 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 31 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
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mark statutes and superprecedents to a central role in constitutional 
argument.  But these attempts have proceeded in an ad hoc fashion, 
and it is past time for us to reflect on these efforts at adaptation and 
build an official constitutional canon that is adequate for use by law-
yers and judges of the twenty-first century. 
I will be elaborating some of the critical questions we should be 
asking in defining this canon.  My test case will be the civil rights era, 
and I will be trying to define its distinctive contribution to the official 
canon in the next Lecture.  But my own conclusions are less important 
than my invitation to the larger legal community to take an active role 
in this project.  The challenge is to understand the constitutional 
achievements of all of the generations since 1776, including Americans 
who lived in the twentieth century.  Without a disciplined acknowl-
edgement of the great legal texts of the modern era, constitutional law 
will fail to provide Americans of the twenty-first century the guidance 
they require as they confront the challenges of the future.32 
The redefinition of the constitutional canon is already proceeding 
apace, most obviously at the recent Senate confirmation hearings of 
President George W. Bush’s Supreme Court nominees.  Senators of 
both parties spent hours and hours trying to pin down John Roberts 
and Samuel Alito on a variety of key twentieth-century texts.  Led by 
Senator Arlen Specter, the nominees were repeatedly asked whether 
they recognized Roe, or some other case, as a superprecedent that was 
especially entrenched in our law.33  The nominees bobbed and weaved 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Under the intellectual leadership of Professors Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson, legal schol-
arship has increasingly appreciated the importance of defining the canon.  See LEGAL CANONS 
(J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).  Their own essay is inspired by literary theory and 
suggests that the legal canon should be defined in terms of the particular audience to which the 
canonical texts are directed: one canon might be suitable for law students; another, for citizens; and 
so forth.  See Balkin & Levinson, Legal Canons: An Introduction, in LEGAL CANONS, supra, at 3, 
5.  This is a useful approach, but it is not mine.  I have one, and only one, problem in mind, and it 
can arise before many different audiences.  The problem is the constitutional legitimation of 
power: whenever anybody challenges the constitutionality of any use of power, the ensuing conver-
sation will find participants focusing on a relatively small number of texts as they attack or defend 
the challenged action.  The canon’s function is to identify these texts.  
  The question of constitutional legitimacy arises in many fora — from the Supreme Court to 
the PTA meeting to the breakfast table.  As participants debate the particular issue before them, 
they may find that they have sharply different views about the texts that rightly belong in the 
canon.  Nevertheless, they will invariably agree on one point: there is only one Constitution in 
America, and whatever its canonical statements include, they should control all uses of legitimate 
power.  If, for example, a participant in a breakfast table conversation invokes the Bible in assess-
ing the constitutionality of some challenged use of power, and if he is not merely engaged in early 
morning chit-chat, he is implying that judges, legislators, and his fellow citizens should also consult 
the Bible in resolving the particular constitutional problem when it comes before them.  
 33 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito To Be Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 321 
(2006) [hereinafter Alito] (Statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(“Do you agree that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as Judge Luttig said?”); 
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in response, but the very questions mark a significant step forward in 
the redefinition of the canon. 
This suggests that our operational canon presently contains at least 
two components: one part is composed of the official canon, and the 
other of judicial superprecedents.  The Supreme Court has an institu-
tional obligation to recognize that superprecedents crystallize fixed 
points in our constitutional tradition, and should not be overruled or 
ignored in the course of doctrinal development.  In this, of course, su-
perprecedents resemble formal amendments, which play a similar shap-
ing role in the operational canon. 
What is even more interesting, superprecedents are often given 
much greater weight than items in the official canon.  Brown v. Board 
of Education is a much more important reference point than, say, the 
guarantee of “a republican form of government” in the Founding text.34  
While no Supreme Court nominee could be confirmed if he refused to 
embrace Brown, he could safely confess great puzzlement about the 
meaning of “republican” government and gain a seat on the bench — 
despite the fact that “the republican government” clause was absolutely 
central to the Founding generation.35  When we look away from our of-
ficial theories for a moment, we see that the living Constitution is or-
ganized on the basis of an operational canon that does not even assign 
primacy, much less exclusivity, to the official canon. 
And yet we are presently reshaping the operational canon in a hap-
hazard and undertheorized fashion.36  Though the notion of a “super-
precedent” is becoming familiar, we have not yet begun to consider, for 
example, whether landmark statutes also deserve a central place in the 
modern constitutional canon.  My affirmative answer isn’t all that 
novel: most notably, Abraham Lincoln repeatedly claimed that the Mis-
souri Compromise should be accorded a “sacred” status comparable to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144–45 (2005) [hereinafter 
Roberts] (Statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking Judge 
Roberts whether Roe qualified as a “super-duper precedent in light . . . of 38 occasions to overrule 
it”).  Judge Roberts was more explicit than Judge Alito in his acknowledgement of Roe and Casey, 
but both nominees recognized the superprecedential status of some great decisions of the twentieth 
century.  Compare, e.g., Roberts, supra, at 145 (Roe), with Alito, supra, at 393 (Roe), and id. at 452 
(Brown). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 35 For a good account of the rise of the clause during the nation’s first century and its precipi-
tous decline after Reconstruction, see WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).    
 36 I applaud Professor Michael J. Gerhardt for raising some of the larger questions in his recent 
exploratory essay, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006).  But these Lectures take a dif-
ferent approach from Professor Gerhardt’s.  They aim to identify superprecedents by considering 
whether they were generated as crucial points in the complex institutional process through which 
the American people exercise their popular sovereignty. 
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the Constitution itself.37  During the twentieth century, a series of im-
portant writers has called on the profession to move beyond the com-
mon law’s skeptical treatment of legislation and to treat major statutes, 
in Justice Stone’s words, as “a source of law, and as a premise for legal 
reasoning.”38  But we have yet to begin the serious exploration of this 
view’s implications for the nuts and bolts of constitutional law. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Lincoln originally borrowed this thought from his rival Stephen Douglas, who had viewed 
the Missouri Compromise as possessing  
an origin akin to that of the constitution of the United States . . . .  All the evidences of 
public opinion at that day, seemed to indicate that this Compromise had been canonized 
in the hearts of the American people, as a sacred thing which no ruthless hand would 
ever be reckless enough to disturb.   
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 247, 251–52 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953) (quoting a speech 
made by Senator Douglas in 1849) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lincoln repeatedly casti-
gated Douglas for repudiating the “canon[ical]” Compromise in backing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.  
Id. at 254, 257–59, 261; see also Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Bloomington, Illinois (Sept. 26, 1854), 
in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra, at 234, 236.  In later addresses, Lin-
coln adopted the Douglas formula without attributing it to its originator.  See, e.g., Abraham Lin-
coln, Speech at Quincy, Illinois (Nov. 1, 1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, supra, at 285, 285 (referring to the Compromise as a “sacred thing which no ruthless 
hand should have dared to destroy”); Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Clinton, Illinois (Oct. 14, 1859), 
in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra, at 487, 488 (referring to the Com-
promise as a “sacred compact”).  
 38 Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1936).  
Speaking broadly, this effort to redeem the dignity of legislation begins at the turn of the century 
with the European-inspired work of Professors Pound and Freund, see Ernst Freund, Interpreta-
tion of Statutes 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207 (1917); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 
HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908), and proceeds in the next generation to famous essays by Stone, supra, 
and James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 
(1934).  Leading modern contributors are GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES (1982), and JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).  All 
these works encourage an integration of statutory principles into the larger body of judge-made 
common law.   
  Another line of thought goes further and seeks to identify a set of “framework statutes” that 
serve quasi-constitutional functions.  Once again, the initial breakthrough comes from a legal 
scholar with European training.  See Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct 
of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 481–92 (1976) (iden-
tifying “framework legislation” as a preferred tool for regulating constitutional problems in foreign 
affairs).  More recently, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn develop this “framework” theme in a 
pathbreaking analysis.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215 (2001).  As they recognize, it is easier for a super-statute to pass their criteria than mine.  
See id. at 1267–75.  This seems appropriate, as I am concerned with landmark statutes that de-
serve full admission into the constitutional canon, while they deal with a broader class of super-
statutes that deserve quasi-constitutional status of a lesser, but still very significant, kind.  Id. at 
1264–67.  Given these different objectives, our approaches seem more complementary than com-
petitive.     
  Finally, Professor Cass Sunstein has developed the notion of “constitutive commitments” that 
are “widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without a fundamental change in social under-
standing.”  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 62 (2004).  As paradigmatic ex-
amples, he mentions the right to join a labor union, the right to social security, and the right to be 
free from racial discrimination by employers — the very rights that are codified in statutes that, on 
my view, deserve a central place in the modern constitutional canon.  Id. at 62–63.  According to 
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Sustained reflection will not only enrich the ongoing enterprise of 
constitutional interpretation.  It will also highlight the high stakes in-
volved in the effort by Justice Scalia, and many others, to challenge the 
very notion of a living Constitution.  We will come to see Justice 
Scalia’s challenge as an invitation to cut ourselves off from the Ameri-
can people’s great constitutional achievements of the twentieth century. 
This is sheer folly.  I do not propose to worship at the shrine of the 
twentieth century.  From the Founding to the present day, each genera-
tion of Americans has contributed something to our constitutional leg-
acy — some more, some less — and each generation has made its share 
of mistakes.  But to cut ourselves off from three-quarters of a century, 
simply because Americans successfully mobilized to express their new 
constitutional conclusions through national institutions, and not 
through the state-centered institutions envisioned by the Founders — 
that is folly. 
I want to emphasize the historicist character of my critique.  For 
me, the “living Constitution” is not a convenient slogan for transform-
ing our very imperfect Constitution into something better than it is.  
While the effort to make the Constitution into something truly wonder-
ful is an ever-present temptation, the problem with this high-sounding 
aspiration is obvious: there are lots of competing visions of liberal de-
mocratic constitutionalism, and the Constitution shouldn’t be hijacked 
by any one of them.  The aim of interpretation is to understand the 
constitutional commitments that have actually been made by the 
American people in history, not the commitments that one or another 
philosopher thinks they should have made.39  On this key point, I am 
closer to Justice Scalia than to Professor Ronald Dworkin.40  I part 
company when Scalia joins Alfarabi in assuming that the formal text 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Professor Sunstein, disturbing these commitments would amount to “a violation of a trust,” but 
nonetheless “it is not seriously argued that they are encompassed by anything in the Constitution.”  
Id. at 62.  
  To which I say: “It all depends on what Professor Sunstein means by capitalizing ‘Constitu-
tion.’”   
 39 Professor Jed Rubenfeld’s fine work on the nature of constitutional commitment is particu-
larly relevant.  See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 91–103 (2001); JED RUBENFELD, 
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 71–141 (2005). 
 40 Compare RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1–38 (1996), with Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).  There is a very wide distance be-
tween Justice Scalia and Professor Dworkin, with space enough for many different views about 
interpretation.  
  There is a closer connection between Professor Dworkin’s earlier work on the central impor-
tance of integrity in legal interpretation in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986), and my 
current thinking — but this is not the place to elaborate the similarities and differences. 
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contains the complete constitutional canon, thereby cutting himself off 
from the last seventy-five years of constitutional achievement. 
Justice Scalia is not the only one making this mistake.  Almost eve-
rybody does, albeit in a watered-down form.  To see my point, distin-
guish two issues: canon definition and canon interpretation.  The first 
seeks to identify the key texts of our tradition; the second, to figure out 
what they mean.  Almost all of our debates center on the second ques-
tion.  Some think that the grand abstractions of the formal Constitution 
should be limited to the particular understandings of the generation 
that enacted them; others think that it is up to the living to fill in the 
best interpretation of the First Amendment or the Equal Protection or 
Due Process Clauses.  But both sides focus on the same constitutional 
canon — the formal text running from Article I, written in 1787, 
through the latest twentieth-century amendment.  To be sure, the ad-
vocates of living constitutionalism more readily grasp the significance 
of twentieth-century transformations as they elaborate the modern 
meaning of ancient texts.  But they do so in ways that sometimes dis-
tort these more recent achievements, and they sometimes use the more 
abstract texts in the official canon as a springboard for elitist efforts to 
revolutionize American values. 
Originalists, in contrast, lack the courage of their convictions.  Per-
haps Justice Thomas is willing to question the constitutionality of pa-
per money, but I suspect that even he would find this prospect a bit 
daunting.41  Certainly Justice Scalia proudly declares himself a reason-
able originalist and explicitly tempers his fidelity to Founding under-
standings when they are too out of line with existing precedents and 
contemporary realities.  But Justice Scalia lacks principles to explain 
when he will be reasonable and when he will be originalist.42 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 389 (concluding that 
paper money is inconsistent with original understanding); cf. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 603, 627 (1870), overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).  Hepburn 
was overruled after court-packing.  See CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, pt. 1, at 677 (1971).  
 42 Justice Scalia has famously described himself as a “faint-hearted originalist,” Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 861–64 (1989), who uses the doctrine of 
stare decisis as a pragmatic device to restrain an all-out assault on the twentieth century, see, e.g., 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206–08 (2005) (accepting the New Deal’s legitimation of broad 
national regulatory power); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, su-
pra note 40, at 129, 138 (arguing that modern doctrine’s expansive understanding of the First 
Amendment is “irreversible,” regardless of “whether or not [these doctrines] were constitutionally 
required as an original matter”).  More generally, Justice Scalia understands that “the whole func-
tion of the doctrine” of stare decisis is “to make us say that what is false under proper analysis 
must nonetheless be held true, all in the interest of stability.”  Id. at 139.  Justice Scalia recognizes 
the “pragmatic” character of his approach, but despite his famous denunciation of discretionary 
judgments in constitutional law, he creates a gaping exception when it comes to deciding when 
constitutional truth is more or less important than constitutional stability.  See id. at 140. 
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It is time to question the premise organizing these familiar debates.  
Rather than focusing myopically on the great texts of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, we must redefine the canon to permit a 
deeper understanding of what Americans did, and did not, accomplish 
over all of our history, including the part that is closest to us. 
By taking up the problem of canon definition, we shall be preparing 
the way for a breakthrough in the current impasse over interpretation.  
Once we get clearer about what we should be interpreting, the debate 
over how to interpret will take a different shape.  Many disagreements 
that sound fundamental today will turn out to be arguments over the 
proper weight to be given to principles derived from twentieth-century 
texts as opposed to those inherited from earlier centuries.43  In contrast, 
proponents of similar-sounding positions today may often find that they 
have deeper disagreements than they had formerly imagined. 
If my proposal were adopted — and stranger things have happened 
— legal debate would have a rather different shape in 2020.  Nowa-
days, slogans like originalism and living constitutionalism serve as 
soundbites suggesting their advocates’ political positions on a wide 
range of hot-button issues.  But a redefined canon would create a host 
of strange allies in the ongoing conversation that is our Constitution.  
Not, mind you, that the participants would magically come to universal 
agreement on the One True Meaning of the reformulated canon; but at 
least they would be talking to one another, rather than shouting at one 
another, about the contributions made by every generation over the 
course of the past two centuries. 
My ultimate aim, in short, is to deny that law is politics by other 
means and that constitutional interpretation is mere pretense.  Since 
the time of Marbury v. Madison,44 our legal culture has managed to 
provide Americans with a common reference point even as they waged 
an unceasing effort to transform the constitutional baseline for succeed-
ing generations.45  If we allow this culture to disintegrate into a parti-
san shouting match, we will lose a great deal. 
But we will never construct a solid foundation for legal interpreta-
tion by pretending that the American people have accomplished noth-
ing of importance over the past seventy-five years.  The life of the law, 
somebody once said,46 is not only logic but experience.  The time has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 For some preliminary reflections, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDA-
TIONS 86–99 (1991) (outlining the problem of intergenerational synthesis). 
 44 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 45 I develop these reflections on Marbury further in BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF 
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 224–44 (2005).  
 46 Not Holmes, who categorically devalues logic in his famous dictum.  See OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction Publishers 2005) (1881).  Holmes 
softens his “anti-logical” stance a bit in the text following immediately after his great apothegm: 
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come to build a canon for the twenty-first century based on the truth of 
the entire American experience. 
II.  LECTURE TWO: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
Constitutional history goes in cycles.  Since 1776, each rising gen-
eration has looked up the political heights to find that the government 
of the day was hell-bent on oppression.  Time and again, the same re-
sponse: organize an oppositional movement in the political wilderness, 
reclaim corrupt government in the name of We the People, and redefine 
America’s constitutional future.  We have been through eight major cy-
cles: In 1776, the revolutionary cry was “no taxation without represen-
tation,” but when this victory was finally won,47 the Jeffersonian Re-
publicans were soon leading the charge for a second American 
revolution;48 a generation later, the Jacksonians were denouncing the 
Bank of the United States and its stranglehold on ordinary Americans49 
— only to see their political hegemony destroyed by the rising Republi-
can Party rallying the People against the Jacksonian defense of the 
slave power;50 a generation later, the Republicans had become the 
spokesmen for the status quo, provoking a Populist crusade climaxing 
in the presidential elections of 1896 and 1900.51 
But then, something different happened: in contrast to every great 
protest movement since 1776, the Populists failed to scale the com-
manding heights, and a period of stuttering followed, with a host of 
middle-level changes without a strong sense of direction52 — until 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed.  
Id.  For an insightful discussion, see Scott Brewer, Traversing Holmes’s Path Toward a Jurispru-
dence of Logical Form, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 94 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000). 
 47 See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787 (1969). 
 48 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 45. 
 49 See generally GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(forthcoming 2007).  Professor Magliocca makes an important contribution to the relatively under-
studied cycle involving the rise, triumph, and fall of Jacksonian constitutionalism. 
 50 See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988). 
 51 See generally LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST 
MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976). 
 52 There are many specialist studies of particular amendments passed during the Progressive 
Era, but no book compares the very different forms of constitutional politics that generated the 
various amendments of that era.  For a work that tries to view progressivism as a whole, without 
undertaking this comparison, see MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003). 
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Franklin Roosevelt took up the populist campaign against “economic 
royalism” in response to the Great Depression, and then broadened and 
deepened New Deal constitutionalism during the Second World War.53  
Yet this decisive breakthrough served only to frame the next genera-
tion’s constitutional politics, culminating in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
successful appeal to the American people during the civil rights era; 
and we are, quite obviously, living through yet another cycle today. 
With each turn of the wheel, the oppositional movement proposes a 
revisionist diagnosis of the public and its problems — sometimes gain-
ing massive support from the American people, sometimes falling short.  
Whatever the fate of particular movements, the cyclical pattern recurs 
and recurs — the brainchild of America’s shotgun marriage between 
the Revolutionary Enlightenment and Protestant Christianity.54 
The living Constitution is a product of these eight cycles of popular 
sovereignty,55 and its study requires careful attention to the themes and 
variations elaborated over the course of two centuries.  History is full 
of surprises.  No cycle is the exact replica of any other.  But if we are to 
understand the real and existing American Constitution, we must put 
each cycle in the context of the others, summing up the constitutional 
conclusions reached by the American people over two centuries of 
struggle.  We cannot blindly suppose that the formal constitutional text 
tells us all — or even most — of what we need to know. 
Begin by reflecting on the great institutional divide that separates 
the Founding model of popular sovereignty from the recurring pattern 
that has emerged over the past two centuries.  The Philadelphia Con-
vention neither expected nor desired Presidents to claim popular man-
dates for sweeping constitutional change56 — this plebiscitary theme 
begins only with Thomas Jefferson and ends, for the moment, with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  The rise of the Progressive Party in 1912, led by presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt, 
provided an opportunity to give the varieties of progressivism a stronger institutional focus.  See 
Sidney M. Milkis & Daniel J. Tichenor, “Direct Democracy” and Social Justice: The Progressive 
Party Campaign of 1912, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 282 (1994).  Although Roosevelt won more votes 
than Republican William Howard Taft, his movement-party did not manage to defeat the Democ-
rat Woodrow Wilson, who gained the presidency with only forty-two percent of the popular vote.  
David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1912 Presidential Election Results (2005), 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1912. 
 53 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? 45–96 (1995); 
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 279–311. 
 54 Compare SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD (1978), with HANNAH 
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). 
 55 Other significant constitutional movements have made contributions as well — most notably 
those occurring in the aftermath of Populism’s defeat.  Given the inadequacies of presidential 
leadership during this period, some of the notable movement successes during the interregnum be-
tween Populism and the New Deal were memorialized through the classical Article V system in the 
Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and especially the Nineteenth, Amendments. 
 56 See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 42–46 (1979). 
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George W. Bush.57  The failure of the Founders to foresee this devel-
opment was forgivable: there weren’t any presidentialist systems 
around at the time, and past history pointed them to popular assem-
blies as the privileged forum for popular sovereignty.  During the Glo-
rious Revolution, it was the Convention/Parliament that spoke for the 
People, definitely not the King, and this scenario had just been re-
peated during the American Revolution. 
The Philadelphia Convention was part of this citizen-assembly tra-
dition58 and projected it into the future.  One of the Founders’ great 
aims was to prevent the presidency from becoming a platform for 
demagogues.  They excluded the presidency from any role in constitu-
tional revision and designed the Electoral College to prevent Presidents 
from claiming a popular mandate from the American people.  Their 
Whiggish history had taught them that the great enemies of republics 
were demagogues like Caesar and Cromwell, and they were determined 
to block this particular path to tyranny in the new republic.59 
But when tested by events, their constitutional machinery was shat-
tered with spectacular speed.  The ink was hardly dry before the parti-
san struggle between Adams Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans 
destroyed the original understanding of the presidency during the elec-
tion crisis of 1800.60  The basic change is only dimly reflected in the re-
vised election mechanics established by the Twelfth Amendment.61  
The shift involved the transformation of the presidency into an office 
that could legitimately speak in the name of the American people and 
was therefore entitled to play a key part in the ongoing process of 
higher lawmaking. 
The victorious Jeffersonians created a three-part pattern of popular 
sovereignty that would reverberate through American history.  I call it 
the movement-party-presidency pattern, and its historical development 
is at the center of my understanding of the living Constitution.62  Since 
this pattern wasn’t anticipated by the Founders, we must study its dy-
namics in a common law fashion, comparing each great cycle of presi-
dential leadership with the others.  There is no other way to under-
stand how the American people have in fact sought to maintain control 
over their government over the past two centuries. 
Movement, party, presidency — some definitions would be helpful.  
The defining feature of a movement is its activists, a large body of citi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 57 See ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 249–50.  
 58 See WOOD, supra note 47, at 162–67. 
 59 See CEASAR, supra note 56, at 48. 
 60 See ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 16–35, 77–93. 
 61 See id. at 203–06. 
 62 See id. at 21–22, 256–66; Bruce Ackerman, The Broken Engine of Progressive Politics, AM. 
PROSPECT, May–June 1998, at 34. 
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zens who are willing to invest enormous time and energy in the pursuit 
of a new constitutional agenda.  Jeffersonian Republicans weren’t 
blowing smoke in asserting that a “second American revolution” was 
required to save the Republic from the “monocratic” Federalists.63  
Whatever you or I might think about their diagnosis, they really be-
lieved it and, no less importantly, acted on it; the same is true of Lin-
coln’s Free Soil Republicans and Roosevelt’s New Deal Democrats and 
George W. Bush’s Religious Right. 
Which leads to the idea of a movement-party.  Most movements 
don’t get off the ground, and most that do don’t form a new party or 
colonize an old one.  But as the Jeffersonians taught, a movement-party 
can be a powerful thing, providing a home for conviction-politicians 
who view their election as a popular mandate for fundamental change. 
Movement-parties are always in a race against time.  Idealistic mo-
tivations fade because some problems get solved, others go away, and 
new problems arise that defy the movement’s ideology.  Power begins 
to corrupt movement-politicians, and the party increasingly serves as a 
magnet for opportunists who couldn’t care less about its originating 
ideals.  The broad popular movement for constitutional change inexo-
rably becomes a memory. 
Call this the normalization of movement politics,64 and it gives 
added importance to the third element in the pattern: the plebiscitarian 
presidency.65  By virtue of his strategic position, a movement-President 
has the organizational resources to win the race against time by mobi-
lizing a winning coalition in Congress in support of landmark legisla-
tion and by winning the confirmation of movement-judges to the Su-
preme Court. 
All of this defies the expectations of the Framers, but our twentieth-
century experience requires us to confront it squarely, because it pro-
vides the key to the dilemma that I presented in my first Lecture.  Our 
problem, you will recall, is that the formal system of amendment no 
longer marks the great changes in constitutional course ratified by the 
American people over the last seventy-five years.66  I argued in my first 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 24–25. 
 64 In speaking of the “normalization of movement politics,” I adapt a familiar Weberian notion 
— the “bureaucratization of charisma” — to American political life.  For a comparable effort, see 
ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL 
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., Jarrold & Sons 1915).  
But Michels is a very distant role model since his subject was the bureaucratization of the Euro-
pean Socialist parties in late-nineteenth-century Europe, involving dynamics that were very differ-
ent from the American experience with movement-parties. 
 65 Though it does not use the term, the best book in political science on presidential plebisci-
tarianism is STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 36–39, 41–43 (1993) 
(describing “politics of reconstruction” and “politics of articulation”). 
 66 See supra pp. 1741–42. 
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Lecture that this failure was the product of an increasing mismatch be-
tween the federalist framework of formal amendment and the rising 
national consciousness of the American people.  Given this mismatch, it 
no longer made sense to allow a small minority of the states — which 
might contain fewer than five percent of the country’s inhabitants67 — 
to veto new fundamental commitments made self-consciously by sus-
tained national majorities.  If popular sovereignty was going to have a 
future in twentieth-century America, Americans would have to develop 
a credible constitutional vocabulary that allowed the nation to address, 
and sometimes resolve, the fundamental questions tossed up by his-
tory.68  Here is where today’s thesis enters: precisely because the 
movement-party-presidency pattern goes back to the days of Jefferson, 
it provided a deeply familiar language for popular sovereignty that 
filled the void left in the public mind by the marginalization of the 
formal Article V system. 
The watershed was the movement-party-presidency of Franklin 
Roosevelt, which successfully legitimated the activist welfare state in 
landmark statutes like the National Labor Relations Act69 (NLRA) and 
the Social Security Act, and in superprecedents like Wickard v. Fil-
burn70 and United States v. Darby.71  But since I have already written 
about the birth agonies of the New Deal regime,72 this Lecture takes a 
first look at the distinctive presidential dynamics of the civil rights 
revolution.  Forty years have passed since the days of Earl Warren and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Lyndon Johnson — long enough to put 
their constitutional breakthrough into historical perspective.  I will be 
arguing that the institutional dynamics of the Reconstruction and the 
New Deal provide powerful insights into the process through which the 
Court, the President, and Congress managed to speak for the People 
during the civil rights era.  With the aid of these examples, I will be 
presenting the landmark statutes of the 1960s as functionally equiva-
lent to the constitutional amendments of the 1860s.  It follows that they 
deserve a central place in the constitutional canon for the twenty-first 
century.73 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 The thirteen least populous states contain thirteen million citizens, or about 4.5% of the 
country.  An amendment can fail, then, if it is opposed by fewer than 3% of Americans, so long as 
they are strategically distributed.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population for 
the United States, Regions, and States and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006, at tbl. 1 
(2006), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2006-01.xls. 
 68 See supra pp. 1749–51. 
 69 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
 70 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 71 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 72 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 255–382.  For a review of the ensuing debate, see Laura 
Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999). 
 73 Although it has some antecedents, see sources cited supra note 38, my discussion of landmark 
statutes is relatively novel in the American context.  But the use of such statutes is already part of 
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In past work, I have shown how key constitutional transformations 
in American history have passed through a distinctive institutional dy-
namic, consisting of five phases: signaling, proposing, triggering, ratify-
ing, and finally consolidating the new principles supported by the 
American people.74  I will be using this same framework here. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
There are always lots of movements trying to push their constitu-
tional agendas onto the center stage of popular debate.  Most fail, but 
occasionally one or another major institution adopts a movement-
agenda in a way that compels sustained attention across the political 
spectrum.  This institutional signal, as I call it, inaugurates a serious 
exercise in constitutional politics, with movements and counter-
movements mobilizing to confront the rising agenda as it becomes in-
creasingly salient. 
From the era of Thomas Jefferson to the era of George W. Bush, 
this signaling function has typically been the sovereign prerogative of a 
President backed by a movement-party.  But things were different at 
mid-century: this time around, it was the Supreme Court that forced 
the question of equality onto the center of the constitutional stage.75  In 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
contemporary French constitutional practice.  Under the Fifth Republic, the Constitutional Court 
is authorized to identify “fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic,” and it 
has done so on ten occasions.  See Bruno Genevois, Une Catégorie de Principes de Valeur Consti-
tutionnelle: Les Principes Fondamentaux Reconnus par les Lois de la République, 14 REVUE 
FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 477 (1998) (discussing the first nine cases); Décisions et 
Documents du Conseil Constitutionnel: Jurisprudence, 13 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 8, 12–19 (2002) (discussing the most recent decision).  For a broader assess-
ment of the use of statutes as sources of constitutional principles, see VÉRONIQUE CHAMPEIL-
DESPLATS, LES PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX RECONNUS PAR LES LOIS DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE: PRINCIPES CONSTITUTIONNELS ET JUSTIFICATION DANS LES DISCOURS 
JURIDIQUES 69–107 (2001). 
 74 See ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 7–11; ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 53, at 73–104; 
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 23–25. 
 75 It is true, of course, that the presidency of Harry Truman was a significant moment in the 
history of civil rights.  His nominating convention was the scene of the Dixiecrat revolt in response 
to the adoption of a strong civil rights plank in the platform.  Once he was elected, Truman fa-
mously desegregated the military, and his Justice Department took consistently favorable positions, 
as amicus curiae, in important civil rights cases.  
  Nevertheless, it would be stretching to say that all this presidential activity amounted to a 
signal placing the civil rights agenda at the very heart of American political life.  In fact, Truman 
avoided any strong positions on civil rights during the 1948 presidential campaign.  See GARY A. 
DONALDSON, TRUMAN DEFEATS DEWEY 188–89 (1999).  And if there was anything dominat-
ing the constitutional agenda during the Truman and early Eisenhower Administrations, it was the 
movement led by Joseph McCarthy, not the one led by the likes of Martin Luther King, Jr. (who 
was still in school).  See BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 
53 (1990) (“Early in the decade [of the 1950s], concern over subversive activities and over McCar-
thyism were the dominant issues, at least among political elites. . . . Civil rights for blacks, which 
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calling Brown v. Board of Education an institutional signal, I take a 
middle path between legalists who exaggerate Brown’s significance and 
political scientists who trivialize it.76  For legalists, the Warren Court 
appears at the center of the story throughout the entire civil rights era, 
leading a reluctant nation to heed, at long last, the commands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Political scientists are right to scoff at this 
judge-centered vision — Brown remained very vulnerable until the 
Court was reinforced by constitutional politics during the Johnson 
presidency.  But while Brown failed to integrate many schools of the 
Deep South during the 1950s,77 it did catalyze an escalating debate that 
ultimately penetrated the nation’s workplaces and churches, breakfast 
tables and barrooms, in a way that is rare in America (or any other 
country for that matter).78 
Trivializers don’t do justice to this central point.  Higher lawmak-
ing in America is never a matter of a single moment; it is an extended 
process, lasting a decade or two, that begins when a leading govern-
mental institution inaugurates a sustained period of extraordinary 
popular debate, which gradually culminates in a series of key legal 
texts that express the will of a decisive majority of ordinary Americans 
at the polls.  Brown’s role in precipitating this debate is a big deal.79  It 
assured that fundamental change, if it ever came, would not come as 
the result of some diktat from above, but through debate and decision 
from below. 
But would Americans ever make a decisive break with Jim Crow?  
There have been many failed constitutional moments in our history, 
and throughout the 1950s, Brown provoked a strong segregationist 
backlash.80  No sober observer could say whether this counter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
had regained agenda status in the late 1930s, was a continuing issue but one with little saliency 
beyond the participants and those directly affected.”).  
  Truman’s efforts on behalf of civil rights, while a significant development in the evolution of 
normal politics, were overwhelmed by the debate precipitated by the Cold War and did not re-
motely compare with the pervasive debate catalyzed by Brown, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), 
and the rising civil rights movement of the later 1950s. 
 76 The legalists are legion; the classic trivializing account is GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42–169 (1991). 
 77 Id. at 50 tbl.2.1, 53 tbl.2.2 (establishing that substantial integration occurred only during the 
late 1960s, after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965).   
 78 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 364–66 (2004).  
 79 There are two basic questions about Brown: Did it discharge the signaling function?  If so, 
did it legitimately do so?  The first question requires an empirical investigation of the extent to 
which Brown, and later Cooper, provoked an ongoing and wide-ranging debate in the country; the 
second question requires a theory of interpretation that defines the occasions under which well-
established precedents, like Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), may be legitimately overruled.  
I try to answer the first question here; I tried to answer the second in 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 
43, at 142–50.  I hope to discuss the relationship between these two answers in future work.  
 80 See KLARMAN, supra note 78, at 389–442.  
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mobilization would bring the movement for racial justice to a screech-
ing halt.81 
Kennedy’s victory in 1960 did nothing to resolve the uncertainty.  
His public record on civil rights had been weaker than Nixon’s during 
the 1950s,82 and the Democrats were traditionally the party of Jim 
Crow.  Public opinion polls show that ordinary Americans didn’t be-
lieve that the Democratic Party was more racially liberal than the Re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 Here I part company with Professors Klarman and Rosenberg, who suggest that underlying 
economic and social changes made dramatic progress in race relations almost inevitable within the 
next generation.  See id. at 310; ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 40.  
  I am skeptical.  As will appear, see infra pp. 1769–70, the passage of the landmark statutes 
was not a political inevitability in the 1960s.  And if the civil rights movement had failed to take 
advantage of its window of opportunity, we might still be waiting for the return of another politi-
cally propitious moment for a massive legislative breakthrough.  If the opportunity had been 
missed, the next generation might well have witnessed smaller legal initiatives, and social norms 
might have evolved in generally egalitarian directions.  But it is easy to underestimate the extent to 
which the landmark statutes of the 1960s have served as salient benchmarks in the evolution of 
social practice.  If they had not gained passage, we might well be struggling against many un-
apologetically racist practices that Americans have now put behind them. 
  More generally, I reject models of societal change that seek to identify social and economic 
sectors that serve as “the engine of history” while treating all the other sectors as if they were mere 
epiphenomena.  The Marxist distinction between “base” and “superstructure” is the most familiar 
example of this device, but Professors Klarman and Rosenberg are reviving an older Whiggish ver-
sion in asserting that the economic and educational gains by blacks were the engines of inevitable 
racial progress in politics and law.     
 82 Even his admirers recognize that Kennedy “knew and cared comparatively little about the 
problems of civil rights and civil liberties” during his years in the Senate.  THEODORE C. 
SORENSEN, KENNEDY 17 (1965).  As he campaigned for the vice-presidential nomination in 
1956, Kennedy undertook a largely successful effort to win Southern support against his rival, Es-
tes Kefauver of Tennessee, whose strength was north of the Mason-Dixon line.  See NICK 
BRYANT, THE BYSTANDER: JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
EQUALITY 58 (2006) (“Bizarre though it was to see segregationists cheering on a Roman Catholic 
Harvard graduate, Mississippi’s twenty delegates whooped rebel yells as they cast their votes for 
the New Englander, while Strom Thurmond’s South Carolina delegation kept up a steady chant 
throughout of ‘We Want Kennedy, We Want Kennedy.’”).  Kennedy also voted with the South to 
weaken the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634, despite intense dissatisfac-
tion from Massachusetts’s civil rights organizations.  BRYANT, supra, at 66–76.  In contrast, Vice 
President Nixon squarely condemned the evisceration of the 1957 Act as “one of the saddest days 
in the history of the Senate, because it was a vote against the right to vote.”  Id. at 76. 
  Nixon made his own affirmative contribution to the civil rights cause in his capacity as 
President of the Senate.  Southern filibusters were then based on Senate Rule 22’s requirement of a 
two-thirds majority for cloture.  It was traditionally understood that a two-thirds vote was also 
required to amend Rule 22, but Nixon ruled otherwise at the Senate’s organizational session.  He 
stunned the South by announcing that Rule 22 could be amended by a simple majority vote.  See 
103 CONG. REC. 178–79 (1957).  While Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson managed to deflect this 
assault on the filibuster, Nixon’s ruling suggested a genuine commitment, as it would have been 
easy for him to follow Senate precedents.  
  As the 1960 campaign reached its climax, Kennedy famously telephoned Coretta King when 
Georgia threw her husband into jail.  This gesture did win black votes, but a single phone call was 
hardly enough to mark a decisive turn from Kennedy’s “Southern strategy” of the 1950s.   
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publican Party during the late 1950s and early 1960s.83  Only one thing 
was clear: if, against the odds, Kennedy chose to put the power of the 
presidency behind the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., he would rip apart the New Deal party that had propelled him into 
power.84 
This point marks a key difference between the civil rights era and 
other constitutional moments.  The great movements of the nineteenth 
century had created new political parties as vehicles for popular sover-
eignty, and Franklin Roosevelt managed to integrate the dynamic 
movements of his time into the Democratic Party of the 1930s.  Con-
sider Roosevelt’s treatment of the labor movement: during its first 
Hundred Days, the New Deal broke sharply with the old regime by 
recognizing collective bargaining as a fundamental right — first in the 
National Industrial Recovery Act85 (NIRA), and, later, in the NLRA.86  
These statutory initiatives, in turn, provoked a mass unionization cam-
paign, with organizers marching through the country with signs pro-
claiming, “The President wants YOU to join a Union!”87 
This was definitely not the message President Kennedy sent to the 
freedom-rides and sit-ins of the early 1960s.  There were no grand ini-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 Between 1954 and 1962, Americans considered the Republicans to be the more racially lib-
eral political party, albeit by relatively small margins.  See EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. 
STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
111 fig.4.7 (1989).  This is hardly surprising: not only were the Republicans the party of Lincoln, 
but it was a Republican Chief Justice who had written the opinion in Brown and a Republican 
President who had given the decision crucial support at Little Rock.  While Northern black voters 
had moved into the Democratic Party during the New Deal, Eisenhower had successfully made 
significant inroads in 1956, winning almost 40% of the black vote.  Id. at 46. 
  The Republicans lost their image of racial liberalism between 1960 and 1964, when there 
was a rapid shift of about twenty-five percentage points in favor of the Democrats as the civil 
rights agenda moved onto center stage in Washington under a liberal Democratic Congress and 
presidency.  Id. at 46 fig.2.1.   
 84 Roy Wilkins of the NAACP recalled: 
The first thing that leaked out of the [Kennedy] White House . . . within ten days of his 
election . . . [was] this word that he positively was not going to advocate any civil rights 
legislation in the new Congress . . . because he did not want to split the party and didn’t 
want to split the Congress when he had so much new legislation on major issues that he 
wanted to [have passed].   
DAVID NIVEN, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: THE KENNEDYS, THE FREEDOM RIDES, AND 
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF A MORAL COMPROMISE 27–28 (2003) (omissions in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See generally Donald W. Jackson & James W. Rid-
dlesperger, Jr., John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civil Rights, in PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 107 (James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. & Donald W. Jackson eds., 1995) 
(reviewing the literature and emphasizing Kennedy’s political pragmatism).  
 85 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed 1966). 
 86 See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (elaborating the radical character of the New 
Deal transformation of labor relations). 
 87 See IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 37–125 (1970) (summarizing unionization 
campaigns provoked by the passage of section 7(a) of the NIRA).  
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tiatives for racial justice during his first Hundred Days.  Kennedy 
waited three years before coming up with a strong legislative pro-
posal.88  Even then, he was not prepared to overpower a bitter-end 
Senate filibuster by Southern Democrats.  The white South had pro-
vided the President with his margin of victory in 1960, and he was not 
going to burn his bridges to a key constituency with a revolutionary 
Civil Rights Act in the run-up to his campaign for reelection.89 
The movement-party-presidency dynamic was stalled — at least un-
til 1965, and possibly forever.90  It was only a paradoxical mix of trag-
edy and comedy that opened up a constitutional space for decisive ac-
tion.  First, the comedy — our existing system of vice-presidential 
selection is a bad joke, giving presidential candidates powerful incen-
tives to “balance the ticket” by naming a running mate from a different 
region who speaks with a different ideological accent.91  Next, the trag-
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 88 A generally admiring Arthur Schlesinger summarizes Kennedy’s civil rights program during 
his first two years as “piecemeal improvements in existing voting legislation, technical assistance to 
school districts voluntarily seeking to desegregate, an extension of the life of the Civil Rights 
Commission.”  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN 
THE WHITE HOUSE 951 (1965).  For surveys of the broader array of Kennedy’s activities, which, 
apart from crisis management, mixed symbolic gestures on civil rights with the appointment of 
racist federal judges in the South, compare CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE 
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1977), a broadly sympathetic reading of Kennedy’s early years, 
with BRYANT, supra note 82, at 225–427, a broadly critical reading.  When Kennedy announced a 
new civil rights initiative in February 1963, it turned out to be “a collection of minor changes far 
more modest than the 1956 Eisenhower program.”  GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION 
OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 24 (1969).  
Kennedy moved into higher gear only in response to the scenes of police brutality precipitated by 
civil rights actions in Birmingham, Alabama.  His June 11 television address emphasized, for the 
first time, the moral dimensions of the civil rights question, and he followed up a week later with 
the Administration’s first strong legislative initiative.  BRYANT, supra note 82, at 417–28. 
 89 See NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS 62 (2005) (“[A]s the 1964 election drew closer, Kennedy 
seemed less eager.  As it became clear that Senator Barry Goldwater, a conservative Arizonan, 
probably would be the Republican presidential nominee, King sensed that Kennedy was less in-
clined to push for civil rights.”).   
 90 This view was broadly shared by establishment insiders and movement outsiders.  From the 
outside, Martin Luther King, Jr., said that if Kennedy had lived, “there would have been continual 
delays, and attempts to evade [civil rights legislation] at every point, and water it down at every 
point.”  TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–63, 
at 922 (1988) (internal quotation mark omitted).  From the inside, Harvard Law School Dean Er-
win Griswold, a member of the Civil Rights Commission from 1961 through 1967, comments in his 
oral history:  
One of the most amazing things of the last 25 years is how much Johnson did for civil 
rights.  He went far beyond what anyone could expect.  Much more was accomplished 
under Johnson than would have happened if Kennedy had stayed [alive].  Of course, the 
times were different, but it wasn’t just the assassination.  Kennedy did not have his feet 
on the ground in civil rights. 
Interview with Erwin Griswold, Member, U.S. Civil Rights Comm’n (Oct. 29, 1975) (transcript on 
file with the John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Scott Rafferty Papers, Box 1). 
 91 The Jeffersonians drafted the Twelfth Amendment with one goal in mind: to avoid turning 
1804 into a replay of the electoral crisis of 1800.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 203–06.  The 
original Constitution had caused this crisis by allowing presidential electors to cast two votes for 
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edy — when an assassin’s bullet strikes the President down, the coun-
try regularly confronts a double shock: not only the shock of loss, but 
also the shock generated by a rising Vice President jerking politics in a 
radically new direction. 
Reconstruction provides the most spectacular historical example.  In 
1864, Lincoln selected a Southern War Democrat, Andrew Johnson, to 
balance the ticket, and so John Wilkes Booth’s bullet put a racial con-
servative in the White House at a moment when Republicans were 
preparing a great leap forward on racial justice.  When the Republican 
Congress first met in December 1865, the Fourteenth Amendment 
wasn’t a high priority.  Instead, Republicans were preparing to use the 
recently ratified Thirteenth Amendment as a platform for a series of 
landmark statutes vindicating the nation’s new commitment to equal-
ity.  It was only Johnson’s repeated vetoes that forced the congressional 
Republicans to propose the Fourteenth Amendment as their election 
platform in 1866 as they struggled to fend off Johnson’s fierce cam-
paign to oust them from office.92 
If Booth had missed his mark at Ford’s Theatre, lawyers would be 
telling themselves a very different story.  In this alternate universe, 
there would have been no angry veto messages by the President de-
nouncing landmark statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1866;93 nor 
would the Republican Congress have found it necessary to pass a 
“court-shrinking” bill that prevented the President from filling Supreme 
Court vacancies with racial conservatives.94  If Lincoln had been safe 
in the White House, he would have proudly signed the landmark stat-
utes and filled the Supreme Court vacancies with strong Republican 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the presidency, without designating the candidate they intended to serve as Vice President.  When 
all Republican electors cast their ballots for the Jefferson-Burr ticket in 1800, the Constitution 
forced the two candidates into a runoff in the House, generating a constitutional crisis.  See id. at 
30–35.  By enacting the Twelfth Amendment in a last-minute rush before the next presidential 
election, the Republicans eliminated this scenario by stipulating that each elector cast one vote for 
President and another distinct vote for Vice President.  They did not appreciate, however, that this 
would create a dynamic in which presidential vacancies would often be filled by Vice Presidents 
with very different convictions — in part because political party dynamics were not well under-
stood at this early phase of American history.  See id. at 203–06. 
 92 See generally 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 169–78. 
 93 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; see also 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 170–71. 
 94 See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.  The statute was a response to Johnson’s ef-
fort to fill a vacancy with his Attorney General, Homer Stanbery.  Rather than considering the 
nomination on the merits, Congress passed a “court-shrinking” bill over the President’s veto, pro-
viding that the departure of Justices from the bench would operate to reduce the size of the Court 
until it had reached seven in number.  The size of the Court was expanded to nine immediately 
upon Grant’s election, see Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, with Senator Charles Buckalew 
explaining: “The reduction was made under peculiar circumstances, and with some reference to 
political considerations two or three years since.  Now that those have passed away, I see no objec-
tion to increasing the number of the judges of that court by one or two.”  CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1487 (1869). 
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Justices who would have overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford95 and up-
held the landmark statutes in eloquent judicial opinions that would 
serve as legal benchmarks for generations of jurists.96  With landmark 
statutes and superprecedents on the books, it would have been unnec-
essary for the Republicans to go further and propose the first section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Reconstruction of the 1860s would 
have looked more like the second Reconstruction of the 1960s — with 
formal amendments playing a smaller role, and with landmark statutes 
and judicial opinions much more prominent.97 
Now fast-forward to the 1960s: Kennedy, like Lincoln, balanced his 
election-year ticket with a Southerner named Johnson.98  But this time, 
the assassin’s bullet shifted the presidency sharply to the left, not to the 
right.  While Andrew Johnson repudiated the movement-Republicans 
of the 1860s, Lyndon Johnson rejected Kennedy’s caution on civil 
rights, making common cause with Martin Luther King, Jr., to generate 
a novel variation on the presidentialist model of popular sovereignty.99 
Johnson faced a different political context from his fallen predeces-
sor.  He was the first Southern President in the White House since An-
drew Johnson left in disgrace in 1869,100 and he could count on a pow-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 96 Lincoln did not make a secret of these intentions.  He had repeatedly stated that the aim of 
Republican politics was to get Dred Scott “reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established 
upon this subject.”  Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858) in 3 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 245, 255.  And again, “[w]e 
know the court that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can 
to have it to over-rule this.”  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 398, 401. 
 97 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 274–77.  Some or all of the other provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might well have been seriously considered by the Republicans.  These 
provisions dealt with the repeal of the three-fifths compromise (Section 2), banning former Confed-
erates from a wide range of offices (Section 3), and prohibiting compensation for the emancipation 
of slaves (Section 4).  But the Republicans would have taken the Article V route only if the Lincoln 
Court had struck down landmark statutes seeking to achieve the same objectives. 
 98 See LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1963–1969, at 91 (1971) (reporting Kennedy’s effort to persuade him to accept the 
vice-presidential nomination because it would “assure support in the Southern states”). 
 99 See generally KOTZ, supra note 89, at 250–77 (elaborating the complex relationship between 
King and Johnson). 
 100 Woodrow Wilson was born and raised in the South, but he owed his national prominence to 
political success in New Jersey.  Johnson was extremely sensitive to the special problems he faced 
as the nation’s first Southern President since the Civil War: 
[There is] a disdain for the South that seems to be woven into the fabric of Northern ex-
perience.  This is a subject that deserves a more profound exploration than I can give it 
here . . . .  Perhaps it all stems from the deep-rooted bitterness engendered by civil strife 
over a hundred years ago, for emotional clichés outlast all others and the Southern cliché 
is perhaps the most emotional of all.  Perhaps someday new understanding will cause this 
bias to disappear from our national life.  I hope so, but it is with us still.   
JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 95. 
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erful “favorite son” vote even if he took the high road on civil rights.101  
For Kennedy, a Senate filibuster of a strong civil rights bill was politi-
cal poison, alienating white Southerners just when he was appealing 
for their votes in his reelection campaign — remember, this was in the 
days before the Voting Rights Act of 1965.102  In contrast, a filibuster 
provided Johnson with a golden opportunity to demonstrate to the na-
tion that he had outgrown the stereotype of the reactionary Southern 
politician.103 
Johnson refused all efforts at a “compromise” that would water 
down the bill, and faced down the longest filibuster in history.104  With 
national polls registering seventy percent support for a strong bill,105 he 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 Despite Johnson’s background, he lost five states of the Deep South to Barry Goldwater, 
largely on the race issue.  See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1964, 
at 380 (1965).  But Johnson’s “favorite son” appeal was sufficient to carry Texas and the middle 
and upper South, despite his decisive support of the Civil Rights Act.  See ROBERT DALLEK, 
FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES, 1961–1973, at 182–83 (1998) (explaining 
Johnson’s Southern strategy). 
 102 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
 103 Johnson’s previous civil rights record was mixed at best.  During his first decade in the 
House, from 1938 to 1948, Johnson voted in stereotypical Southern fashion against every civil 
rights initiative.  See MARK STERN, CALCULATING VISIONS: KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS 120 (1992).  And even as Majority Leader of the Senate, he successfully beat down 
Richard Nixon’s invitation to weaken the filibuster rules at the 1957 opening session of the Senate.  
See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 857–58 
(2002).  At that point, he began to shift, using his power as Majority Leader to deliver civil rights 
acts in 1957 and 1960, but drastically weakening them to avoid Southern filibusters.  See id. at 
893–96, 911, 942–43 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1957); see also ROBERT MANN, THE 
WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 198–99, 252–60 (1996) (discussing the Civil Rights Acts of 
1957 and 1960); JONATHAN ROSENBERG & ZACHARY KARABELL, KENNEDY, JOHNSON, 
AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS TAPES 23–25 (2003) (same).  Johnson also 
pursued a cautiously pragmatic approach when Kennedy appointed him Chairman of the Commit-
tee on Equal Employment Opportunity.  See DALLEK, supra note 101, at 23–30.  But with King’s 
movement gaining new levels of national support in 1963 and 1964, Johnson faced a very different 
political environment, as he later explained:  
I knew that if I didn’t get out in front on this issue [the liberals] would get me . . . .  I had 
to produce a civil rights bill that was even stronger than the one they’d have gotten if 
Kennedy had lived.  Without this, I’d be dead before I could even begin.   
Id. at 114 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Richard Russell echoed 
Johnson’s sentiment when he told a reporter, “If Johnson compromises, . . . he will be called a 
slicker from Texas.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 104 See SEAN J. SAVAGE, JFK, LBJ, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 120–21 (2004); CHARLES 
WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 94–95 (1985).  Johnson initially hesitated on whether to compromise, see 
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra, at 125, but his indecision was momentary, and of no strategic sig-
nificance. 
 105 With the civil rights bill stalled in the Senate, an April 1964 Harris Poll asked a random 
sample of 1250 respondents: “From what you know or have heard, do you favor or oppose  
the civil right[s] bill?”  Seventy percent were in favor; only thirty percent were opposed or not sure.  
Louis Harris & Assocs., Harris Survey (Apr. 1964), available at iPOLL Databank, http://www. 
ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.  Shortly after the bill was signed into law, a Gallup Poll in Octo-
ber indicated nearly 60% were in favor and 31% were opposed (with 87% of these believing that 
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delivered the epochal Civil Rights Act of 1964106 as the presidential 
campaign of 1964 was beginning in earnest.  “Who would have thought 
a year ago that this could happen?” asked Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy as the bill headed for passage.107 
The assassin’s bullet largely accounts for the sharp differences in 
the patterns of constitutional leadership prevailing during the first and 
the second Reconstructions.  In 1866, Booth’s bullet forced the move-
ment–Republican Party to abandon the presidency and to rely on Con-
gress to deepen the nation’s constitutional commitment to equality.  
Once the presidency was lost, Republicans could no longer hope to con-
firm movement-Republican Justices to create superprecedents overrul-
ing Dred Scott and to expound the nation’s new constitutional com-
mitments to equality.  Instead, they confronted a steady stream of 
presidential vetoes challenging their landmark statutes.  If they hoped 
to triumph over this presidential assault, Republicans had little choice 
but to consolidate their egalitarian ambitions through formal amend-
ments under Article V — even though this strategy required military 
power to reconstruct Southern governments in ways that were almost 
guaranteed to alienate white opinion over the long run.108 
The assassin’s bullet had a very different — but equally surprising 
— consequence in the 1960s.  Rather than pushing a movement-
Congress to the center stage as in the 1860s, it pushed a movement-
presidency to the forefront.  This time around, the movement for racial 
justice was not forced into a dueling match with a racially conservative 
President.  Martin Luther King, Jr., could join with Lyndon Johnson to 
create a movement-presidency, which would push a reluctant Congress 
to pass the Civil Rights Act that would frame the constitutional mean-
ing of the 1964 elections. 
Once we appreciate the role of the assassin’s bullet, we can see that 
the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and the enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 played precisely the same function 
within the larger dynamic of popular sovereignty.  Both actions pushed 
the system from the signaling stage to the proposal stage.  The Ameri-
can people were now on notice that their political representatives were 
moving beyond the rhetoric of revolutionary reform and were propos-
ing specific legal measures that would radically transform the Constitu-
tion as it was then understood. 
We now reach the third stage in the process.  Here ordinary voters 
get their first chance to pass judgment on the brave new initiatives un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the bill went too far and 5% believing that it went not far enough).  Gallup Org., Gallup Poll (Oct. 
1964), available at iPOLL Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html. 
 106 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 107 KOTZ, supra note 89, at 141. 
 108 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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dertaken in their name in Washington, D.C.  During the first Recon-
struction, this happened in 1866 when President Johnson barnstormed 
around the country appealing to Americans to throw the Radical Re-
publicans out of Congress;109 in 1964, this happened when Barry 
Goldwater ran for President after voting against the Civil Rights 
Act.110  In both cases, a conservative victory would have put an abrupt 
end to the exercise in constitutional transformation: if the 1866 election 
had gone against the Republicans and in favor of Andrew Johnson’s 
Democrats,111 the Fourteenth Amendment would never have been rati-
fied;112 if the 1964 election had come out in favor of Barry Goldwater, 
there would never have been a Voting Rights Act of 1965 or a Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 — even the 1964 Act might not have survived the 
backlash.113 
But it didn’t turn out that way.  Instead, the decisive defeat of the 
conservatives permitted the victors to claim a sweeping mandate from 
the People.  If Brown was the signal and the Civil Rights Act was the 
proposal, the campaign of 1964 culminated in a triggering election, 
which legitimized the Act’s revolutionary reform in the name of We the 
People — authorizing further landmark statutes and pushing the insti-
tutional dynamic toward a fourth stage: ratification. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
I have been using Reconstruction as a lens to gain perspective on 
the civil rights revolution.  But as the popular sovereignty dynamic 
reached its peak in the presidential election of 1964, the legacy of the 
New Deal proved even more important.  Americans in the prime of life 
during the 1960s had lived through the dramatic political and institu-
tional standoffs of the 1930s.  These experiences provided constitu-
tional paradigms that framed the meaning of the 1964 election. 
The crucial reference point was Roosevelt’s landslide victory over 
Alf Landon in 1936.  This triumph authorized the President to claim a 
sweeping mandate from the People for his New Deal, and Lyndon 
Johnson was aiming for the same kind of popular mandate in 1964.  
When Johnson went to the city of Memphis a week before the election, 
he tried to define the mandate he was seeking.  After denouncing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 180. 
 110 See infra pp. 1772–73. 
 111 To increase its popular appeal, the conservative opposition called itself the National Union 
Party during the election campaign of 1866, but this bipartisan image faded as Democratic stal-
warts took increasing control.  See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 
194–96 (1974). 
 112 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 178–83. 
 113 See infra pp. 1778–79. 
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Goldwater’s assault on a variety of New Deal programs, the President 
turned to the future: 
  The settled issues of the 1930’s are not the issues of the 1960’s, and 
that is really the choice you have to make.  Do you want to go back to the 
thirties or do you want to go forward with the sixties? 
. . . 
  If I take my compass or my ruler and take a direct line down the cen-
ter of this crowd and divide you, we can do little; but united, as we are, 
there is little that we cannot do.  And you know one of the things that I 
think we ought to do, and I say this as a man that has spent all of his life 
and cast his every vote in Texas, and as the grandson of two Confederate 
veterans, I think one of the things that we are going to have to do is wipe 
away the Mason-Dixon line across our politics. 
  And because we are good people and because we are fair people, and 
because we are just people, and because we believe in the Good Book, we 
are going to have to follow the Golden Rule, “Do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you,” and when we do that, we are going to wipe away 
the color line across our opportunity. 
  The mandate of this election is going to be a mandate to unite this Na-
tion.  It is going to be a mandate to bind up our wounds and to heal our 
history, and to make this Nation whole as one nation, as one people, indi-
visible, under God.114 
Like Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater was up-front in his ambi-
tions for a sweeping mandate from the People.  Ever since Roosevelt 
crushed Landon in 1936, the Republican Party had nominated a series 
of me-too candidates who accepted basic New Deal premises — Will-
kie, Dewey, Eisenhower, and Nixon.  These “Modern Republicans,” as 
they proudly called themselves, earned nothing but Goldwater’s con-
tempt.  He launched a direct attack on the New Deal and saw the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as yet one more step down the road to serfdom.115  
Although he was not a racist, he cast his vote against the Act, and in a 
Senate speech reported on front pages throughout the nation, he made 
it plain that New Deal constitutionalism was his real enemy.  So far as 
he was concerned, the Act’s effort to regulate “private enterprise in the 
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 114 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks on the River Front in Memphis (Oct. 24, 1964), in 2 PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1406, 1408–09 
(1965).  In retirement, Johnson reflected retrospectively on the 1964 campaign: 
I decided to seek a new mandate from the people.  If Goldwater wants to give the voters 
a choice, I concluded, then we’ll give them a real choice . . . .  Suddenly all the old nit-
picking arguments that separated our parties had been swept aside.  We were now en-
gaged in a colossal debate over the very principles of our system of government.  
JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 103; see also SKOWRONEK, supra note 65, at 336–41 (discussing 
Johnson’s use of Roosevelt, as well as his victory of 1936, as a reference point). 
 115 See BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 25–31, 65–67 (1960) 
(attacking Modern Republicanism); id. at 68–75 (attacking the welfare state as socialistic). 
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area of so-called public accommodations and . . . employment”116 was 
not only unwise as a matter of policy — it was flatly unconstitutional 
without the enactment of a new constitutional amendment, ratified by 
the states as provided by Article V.117 
The election of 1964, in short, raised a central question of constitu-
tional dimension, and one which Johnson’s leadership on behalf of the 
landmark statute put in high relief: was the Civil Rights Act unconsti-
tutional, as Goldwater charged, or a decisive affirmation of constitu-
tional commitment, as Johnson asserted? 
The 1936 landslide victory in support of the New Deal provided the 
relevant benchmark for determining the People’s answer to this ques-
tion.  Goldwater was crushed in a Landon-sized landslide,118 and the 
voters swept into power the most liberal Congress since the end of the 
New Deal.119  This not only allowed Johnson to claim a mandate on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 116 110 CONG. REC. 14,319 (1964) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).  Goldwater’s speech was 
front-page news for the New York Times.  See Charles Mohr, Goldwater Says He’ll Vote “No” on 
the Rights Measure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 1 (“‘If my vote is misconstrued, let it be, and 
let me suffer its consequences,’ the Arizona Senator said.”).  The Times reproduced the Republican 
frontrunner’s speech in full.  See Text of Goldwater Speech on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, 
at 18.  Legal columnist Anthony Lewis explained, on the same page, why Goldwater’s constitu-
tional views were no longer accepted by the courts.  See Anthony Lewis, The Courts Spurn Gold-
water View, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 18.  
 117 See 110 CONG. REC. 14,319 (1964).  Goldwater emphasized that his “basic objection” was to 
New Deal constitutional ideas that authorized the enactment of the Civil Rights Act without a new 
formal amendment.  He also denounced the “creation of a Federal police force of mammoth pro-
portions” and “the development of an ‘informer’ psychology in great areas of our national life — 
neighbors spying on neighbors, workers spying on workers, business spying on businessmen . . . .”  
Id.  But this policy critique came only after his refutation of New Deal constitutionalism. 
 118 Both Roosevelt and Johnson gained about 61% of the popular vote in 1936 and 1964.  ALICE 
V. MCGILLIVRAY ET AL., AMERICA AT THE POLLS, 1960–2004: A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION STATISTICS 23 (2005); ALICE V. MCGILLIVRAY & RICHARD M. 
SCAMMON, AMERICA AT THE POLLS, 1920–1956: A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN PRES-
IDENTIAL ELECTION STATISTICS 13 (1994).  Republicans responded to the electoral debacle of 
1964 by returning to their custom of awarding their presidential nominations to representatives of 
the “Modern Republican” wing of their party.  Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford firmly planted 
themselves within the Willkie-Dewey-Eisenhower tradition of accommodation to the New Deal 
constitutional regime.  See MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 24 (1999) 
(describing Eisenhower’s endorsement); STEVEN WAGNER, EISENHOWER REPUBLICANISM: 
PURSUING THE MIDDLE WAY 121 (2006) (describing the philosophy of Modern Republicanism).  
Ronald Reagan’s rise to the presidency in 1980 would signal a new round of constitutional politics 
that challenged basic premises of the New Deal and civil rights era.  But in 1964, Reagan was only 
beginning his political career as Governor of California. 
 119 Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 295 to 140 in the House, the largest margin since 
1936; in the Senate, the margin was 68 to 32, the largest since 1940.  No less significantly, “Democ-
rats now held a large enough majority to prevail on some measures despite defections by southern-
ers.”  KOTZ, supra note 89, at 261.  In particular, “[t]he new 89th Congress was . . . so inspirited by 
the massive mandate over Goldwater, who had conspicuously voted against the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, that there was little doubt that the Administration’s new voting-rights bill would pass in 
some form.”  HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 166 (1990).   
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civil rights; it also gave him the political leverage to translate these 
words into deeds by leading Congress to enact further landmark legis-
lation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965.120 
The living Constitution was passing a vital test: the presidential 
candidates were talking to one another, rather than past one another, 
on the great issues that divided them.  And it was providing the nation 
with a benchmark — the New Deal landslide of 1936 — for determin-
ing whether one side had won the argument decisively or whether both 
sides might legitimately suppose that the People continued to confront 
the question with an open mind. 
Given its centrality to the living Constitution, the notion of a “popu-
lar mandate” is worth more attention than constitutional lawyers have 
given it.  It is easy to be skeptical of the entire idea.121 
American elections are never single-issue affairs.  Voters always 
have a variety of disparate concerns.  Yet talk of a “popular mandate” 
on one or another Great Issue seems to falsify this obvious point.  In 
1964, for example, Johnson and Goldwater disagreed not only on the 
federal government’s role in securing racial justice, but on the larger 
program of economic justice laid out in the President’s vision of the 
Great Society; they also disagreed about foreign policy, with Johnson 
successfully portraying Goldwater as a “trigger-happy” militarist.122  
This multiplicity of issues is typical and serves as the basis for an im-
portant objection to the very idea of a “popular mandate.” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 120 Johnson’s reflections on his landslide victory are suggestive (but hardly dispositive): 
Many people felt we should rest after the victory of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, take it 
easy on Congress, and leave some breathing space for the bureaucracy and the nation.  
But there was no time to rest. . . . 
 I feared that as long as these [black] citizens were alienated from the rights of the 
American system, they would continue to consider themselves outside the obligations of 
that system.  I tried to state this position as fully as I could in the Presidential campaign.  
I wanted a mandate to move forward, not simply a sanction for the status quo. 
 On November 3, 1964, the American voters gave me that mandate.  I moved to use 
it quickly.  I directed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to begin the complicated 
task of drafting the next civil rights bill — legislation to secure, once and for all, equal 
voting rights. 
JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 160–61 (footnote omitted).  Although Johnson ordered Katzenbach to 
work on the statutory options, he did not make the Voting Rights Act a high priority until later in 
1965, when his electoral mandate had been reinforced by King’s movement activities on behalf of 
voting rights in Selma, Alabama.  See infra pp. 1782–83 and note 142. 
 121 For a classic statement of the skeptical case, see Robert A. Dahl, Myth of the Presidential 
Mandate, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 355 (1990).  For other studies, see PATRICIA HEIDOTTING CONLEY, 
PRESIDENTIAL MANDATES: HOW ELECTIONS SHAPE THE NATIONAL AGENDA (2001); 
GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, AT THE MARGINS: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS 
(1989); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, THE PUBLIC PRESIDENCY: THE PURSUIT OF POPULAR 
SUPPORT (1983); STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS (1983). 
 122 See, e.g., DENISE M. BOSTDORFF, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE RHETORIC OF 
FOREIGN CRISIS 57 (1994) (describing Johnson’s campaign attack on Goldwater). 
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Call it the “bundling problem”: if many Americans were using their 
ballots in 1964 to vote for prudent moderation in foreign affairs, it 
seems wrong-headed to view the Democratic landslide as representing 
a mandate for racial justice.  More generally, talk of a “mandate from 
the People” invariably privileges a subset of issues and ignores others 
that were important to the voters on election day. 
Despite its initial charms, this objection should be rejected.  It is too 
broad legally and too shallow philosophically.  On the legal side, the 
bundling problem is hardly a unique difficulty posed by modern forms 
of presidential leadership in constitutional revision.  It is equally trou-
blesome when it comes to Article V amendments: voters generally don’t 
focus on candidates’ positions on potential amendments when casting 
ballots for Congress and state legislatures — many other national and 
local issues are far more salient.  Nevertheless, constitutional lawyers 
treat a new formal amendment as an unproblematic expression of We 
the People, without looking beyond the fact that three-fourths of the 
state legislatures had given their solemn approval. 
Which leads to a deeper philosophical point.  Some constitutional 
systems do indeed respond to the bundling objection by trying to re-
move the resolution of constitutional matters from the hands of elected 
politicians.  Special referenda procedures are a familiar part of the con-
stitutions of many states and foreign countries.  But the American Con-
stitution is different.  When operating both in its federal mode (under 
Article V) and in its national mode (under the living Constitution), the 
system leaves it to our political representatives to determine when the 
time is ripe to claim a mandate from the People and translate its mean-
ing into enduring and fundamental legal texts.  In the federal mode, 
these texts take the form of Article V amendments; in the national 
mode, landmark statutes and superprecedents.  To put the point in a 
single line, the American system relies on the forms of representative 
democracy to determine the credibility of a popular mandate and does 
not depend on the forms of direct democracy. 
Both direct and representative systems face the same problem — 
talk is cheap, and it is all too easy for elected politicians to claim a 
mandate from the People under conditions in which such a claim is in-
appropriate.123  Given this obvious point, both systems make it hard 
for political claims of a “mandate” to gain institutional credibility.  Un-
der the direct system, these claims are tested through a specially struc-
tured referendum mechanism, which gives the voters the final say.  
Under the representative system, politicians must keep on winning 
elections until they can gain assent to a revision from a variety of rep-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 123 For a discussion of these conditions, see 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 43, at 266–94 (elaborating 
the criteria of breadth, depth, and decisiveness). 
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resentative institutions that are normally at loggerheads with one  
another. 
Our national Constitution is firmly committed to the representative 
system: when operating in its federal mode, it requires a movement for 
constitutional revision to carry the votes of two-thirds of our represen-
tatives in both houses of Congress and to gain the assent of three-
fourths of the states; when operating in its national mode, it requires 
constitutional reformers to maintain their electoral momentum in the 
face of vigorous dissent by the conservative branches in the system of 
separation of powers.  It is only when a constitutional movement wins 
sustained control of all three branches of the national government that 
it can earn the popular mandate to enact landmark statutes and to ob-
tain the judicial elaboration of superprecedents. 
Both the direct and representative systems have their strengths and 
weaknesses.  In direct systems, the questions put before the People in 
referenda may be misleading, and the voters may often be poorly in-
formed about the real stakes involved.  The method of representative 
government has different vices.  The representatives have a better un-
derstanding of the issues, but the way they express new solutions in 
their decisive legal texts may diverge significantly from the prevailing 
understandings held by the broader public. 
Neither system is perfect — but that’s life, and we had better learn 
to live with it.  While there are many ways to improve existing systems 
of direct and representative government,124 my task here is to interpret 
the American Constitution as it is, not as it ought to be.  Within the ex-
isting American system, the bundling objection is simply inapt: it 
falsely supposes that our Constitution seeks to test claims of a mandate 
by isolating single issues for focused decision by the voters, rather than 
collective and sustained deliberation by representatives.125  Instead, we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 For some suggestions, see 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 410–16; and Bruce Ackerman, 
The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 666–68 (2000). 
 125 I hope to address, in future work, the current tendency of politicians and pundits to define 
“popular mandates” by referring to public opinion polls on the underlying issues raised in a cam-
paign.  This development raises very fundamental issues: it is one thing to revise our existing sys-
tem of representative democracy to incorporate public referenda as a mode of defining popular 
mandates; quite another, to treat privatized polling numbers as if they were the functional equiva-
lent of a public referendum.  For some skeptical remarks on the present state of public opinion 
polling, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 7–8 (2004). 
  At best, public opinion polls serve as crude indications of the breadth of popular support.  
Still, these polls repeatedly revealed supermajorities of sixty to seventy percent supporting the civil 
rights bill.  See supra note 105.  This suggests that Johnson and the liberal Congress were not us-
ing Goldwater’s unpopular positions on foreign policy as a springboard for imposing unpopular 
policies on civil rights. 
  A June 1964 Gallup poll suggests the same conclusion.  The poll asked, “If two candidates of 
your own party were alike in all respects except that one candidate took a strong stand in favor of 
civil rights and the other took a strong stand against civil rights, which man would you be more 
likely to prefer?”  This question seeks to determine the respondent’s position, all other things being 
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should recognize that American politicians earn their authority to speak 
for the People by successfully negotiating a demanding institutional ob-
stacle course that gives their opponents repeated opportunities to defeat 
their claims in a series of national elections.  The point of my five-stage 
analysis is to determine whether the constitutional reformers of the 
civil rights era managed to make it across the finish line. 
From this perspective, the landslide victory of 1964 had a very dif-
ferent constitutional significance for each of the three great issues 
raised in the campaign.  President Johnson did not proclaim his War on 
Poverty until his State of the Union Address of 1964,126 and so his 
landslide victory simply served as an institutional signal that, like 
Brown a decade earlier, began a period of sustained popular debate on 
a new reform agenda.127 
Johnson’s foreign policy mandate had even less constitutional sig-
nificance.  Rather than signaling a new beginning in foreign policy, the 
President was seeking to reassure Americans that he would operate 
well within the bipartisan consensus established by Harry Truman and 
Dwight Eisenhower.  It was Goldwater, not Johnson, who was empha-
sizing the need for a fundamentally new approach. 
In contrast, the civil rights agenda was now ripe for serious consid-
eration by the People, given the past decade of heated debate in courts 
and legislatures, dinner tables and workplaces, throughout the na-
tion.128  And the striking contrast between Johnson and Goldwater in-
exorably tied the future of race relations to the campaign — not only 
was the issue salient, but the rivals obviously intended to drive the 
country in very different directions.129  What is more, the voters swept 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
equal.  The public’s answer: 63% would vote for the pro–civil rights candidate, 23% for the anti–
civil rights candidate, and 15% had no opinion.  See Gallup Org., Gallup Poll (June 25–30, 1964), 
available at iPOLL Databank, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html. 
 126 The Great Society came even later, on May 22, 1964.  See Lyndon Baines Johnson, Remarks 
at the University of Michigan (May 22, 1964), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/ 
johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640522.asp. 
 127 The Democrats failed to follow up on this signal by carrying through their antipoverty 
agenda to a successful conclusion over the next decade.  The defeats of Hubert Humphrey and 
George McGovern made it plain that the American people were not prepared to endorse a consti-
tutional assault on economic inequality — although, of course, many of the statutory initiatives of 
the Johnson years continue to have an important impact on the welfare of Americans today.  For a 
perceptive discussion of the Supreme Court’s refusal to constitutionalize the War on Poverty, 
which rightly emphasizes the significance of Humphrey’s defeat, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 38, at 
153–71. 
 128 See WHITE, supra note 101, at 305 (“[D]iscussion of [civil rights] probably obsessed [private] 
American conversation in the summer and fall of 1964 more than any other [issue].”).  
 129 At a meeting early in the campaign, Goldwater and Johnson responded to a wave of black 
urban riots by agreeing informally, on July 24, to refrain from statements that could further in-
flame the volatile situation.  But at a press conference before that meeting, Johnson made it clear 
that “he had no intention of taking the civil rights issue out of the campaign.”  DALLEK, supra 
note 101, at 134.  I have given Johnson’s Memphis “mandate speech” pride of place in the text, but 
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an extremely liberal Congress into power, one which was prepared to 
back the President’s claim to a mandate on civil rights.130 
Within this context, the Democratic victory of 1964, like that of 
1936, qualifies as a triggering election, pushing the popular sovereignty 
dynamic into a new phase: ratification.  During this period, it still re-
mained possible for conservatives to beat back the liberal assault on 
the constitutional status quo ante — but it became more difficult.  
Suppose, for example, that the Goldwaterites had experienced a re-
markable political revival during the elections of 1966, 1968, and 1970 
— sweeping a new President and Congress into power who managed to 
repeal the landmark statutes and rededicate the country to Barry 
Goldwater’s constitutional views during the dawning days of the new 
decade.  Under this scenario, today’s lawyers would look back on 1964 
as a mere blip, representing little more than a moment of demagogic 
madness. 
This thought experiment helps refine the constitutional significance 
of triggering elections in the American experience.  Before the 1964 
election, the great debate between civil rights and states’ rights was in 
relative equipoise, with neither side in the clear ascendancy in the 
struggle for public support.  But once Johnson and the Democratic 
Congress swept the polls, even bitter-end racial conservatives were 
obliged to recognize that the main current of national opinion was 
moving against them.  To mark this point, I borrow the familiar no-
tions of “burden of persuasion” and “burden of going forward” from the 
law of evidence: with its sweeping victory in presidential and congres-
sional elections, the movement for constitutional reform had now deci-
sively discharged its burden of persuasion, and the burden of going for-
ward had now shifted to the partisans of the old regime.  Unless the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the President had already made a high-visibility speech on the issue in New Orleans on October 9, 
at the end of Lady Bird Johnson’s old-fashioned railroad tour of forty Southern towns.  The First 
Lady’s theme, covered by the national press, was racial justice and the need “to put behind us 
things of the past.”  See RANDALL B. WOODS, LBJ: ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN AMBITION 
542–44 (2006). 
  Barry Goldwater’s position on civil rights was longstanding and well known.  As we have 
seen, Goldwater clearly stated the constitutional grounds of his opposition both in his book, see 
GOLDWATER, supra note 115, at 25–35; see also supra p. 1772, and in his Senate floor speech op-
posing the Civil Rights Act, see 110 CONG. REC. 14,319 (1964); see also supra notes 116–117 and 
accompanying text.  Goldwater repeated these familiar themes in a high-visibility speech on Octo-
ber 22, see Press Release, Republican National Committee, Nationwide TV Address on “The Free 
Society” (transcript of ABC television broadcast Oct. 22, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library), and he blitzed the South during the closing weeks of the campaign with regionally 
televised speeches emphasizing his conservative position on civil rights.  See SOMEHOW IT 
WORKS: A CANDID PORTRAIT OF THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 203 (Gene Shalit & 
L.K. Grossman eds., 1965).  This last-minute emphasis on the civil rights issue increased Goldwa-
ter’s support in the deep South.  See Angus Campbell, Interpreting the Presidential Victory, in 
THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1964, at 256–81 (Milton C. Cummings, Jr., ed., 1966). 
 130 See supra note 119. 
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conservatives could regain control of some of the central institutions of 
the national government, and do it quickly, the separation of powers 
would begin generating a self-reinforcing stream of landmark statutes 
and superprecedents that would consolidate the rising regime of racial 
justice in a way that would endure for generations.  I mark this shift in 
the burden of going forward by saying that the system of popular sov-
ereignty was moving into its ratification phase. 
At this point, the Supreme Court reentered the drama in a big way.  
Its response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 would profoundly shape the ratification enterprise: on the one 
hand, it could strike down the new landmark statutes in the manner of 
the Old Court in the 1930s, forcing the movement-presidency to return 
again to the voters for a further mandate; or on the other, it could learn 
a different lesson from the New Deal experience and endorse the con-
stitutionality of the new statutes, thereby putting a heavier burden on 
racial conservatives as they returned to the electorate to reverse the tri-
umphalist interpretation of the 1964 election. 
The Court didn’t keep the country waiting to hear its answer.  
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964, and 
within months cases challenging its constitutionality were speeding 
their way to the Court.  The Justices heard arguments while the elec-
tion campaign was still in progress, and they unanimously upheld the 
new landmark statute in two cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel131 and 
McClung,132 only a month after the voters had given the President and 
his liberal Congress their sweeping victory. 
But appearances were deceiving.  Despite the absence of dissent, 
the Justices had real difficulties resolving the two cases.  Their problem 
was stare decisis.  In the aftermath of Reconstruction, the Court had 
famously struck down a public accommodations statute in the Civil 
Rights Cases133 of 1883.  And if the modern Court had followed this 
important precedent, it would have been obliged to repudiate large por-
tions of the new Act, despite the 1964 landslide. 
To be sure, the Warren Court hadn’t allowed stare decisis to pre-
vent it from overruling Plessy134 in 1954.  And if the Justices had over-
ruled the Civil Rights Cases in 1964, Heart of Atlanta Motel and 
McClung would have eclipsed Brown in the modern constitutional 
canon.  In this alternative scenario, today’s lawyers and judges would 
be studying these cases, not Brown,135 in their effort to elaborate the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 131 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 132 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).  
 133 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 134 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 135 See David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 
(1989) (discussing the evolution of Brown’s constitutional meaning over time). 
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breakthrough principles of equal protection and state responsibility 
that served as the foundation of the landmark Act of 1964. 
But it was not to be — even though a majority of the Court, includ-
ing the Chief Justice, was prepared to overrule the Civil Rights Cases if 
this were the only way to uphold the new statute.136  There would have 
been a big problem if Chief Justice Warren had led the Court down 
this path.  The records from the Justices’ conferences show that an 
equal protection opinion would have provoked a strong dissent from 
Justice Harlan, and perhaps others.137  This dissent would have pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 136 The smoking gun is an opinion written by Justice Clark during the Court’s internal delibera-
tions over Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).  While the Court was deliberating, Congress was 
debating the civil rights bill.  See Tom Clark, Draft Opinion in Bell v. Maryland (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 1312, Folder 4).  
  Bell was the Court’s toughest sit-in case because it did not involve any of the more obvious 
forms of state action.  The Maryland court had simply enforced a race-neutral criminal trespass 
statute against protesters who had refused to leave a restaurant upon the manager’s request.  Bell, 
378 U.S. at 227.  To reverse the convictions, the Court was obliged to consider whether the expan-
sive definition of state action elaborated by Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), had supplanted 
the Civil Rights Cases’ more restrictive notion in the area of public accommodations.  Justice 
Black assembled a five-man majority (including Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White) for 
upholding the trespass convictions.  Justice Black’s opinion affirmed the authority of the Civil 
Rights Cases and narrowed Shelley’s sweeping rationales.  See Hugo Black, Draft Opinion in Bell 
v. Maryland (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. 
Douglas, Box 1312, Folder 4). 
  But at the last moment, Justice Clark defected, reflecting a concern that a decision against 
the sit-in protestors would give new respectability to the ongoing Southern filibuster against the 
civil rights bill.  See, for example, Justice Brennan’s statement that he “was so concerned that if 
[the Court] came down with Bell v. Maryland on constitutional grounds, it would kill the civil 
rights act,” quoted in HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO 
BLACK, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 168 
(1992). 
  Justice Clark stopped the Court from issuing Justice Black’s opinion on May 15, and he soon 
began working on his own draft invalidating the sit-in convictions on the basis of an expansive 
interpretation of Shelley.  Reflecting his concerns about the pending Civil Rights Act, Justice 
Clark’s opinion explicitly invited Congress to take the “necessary steps” to legislate clear rules that 
would “meet the necessities of the situation.”  Clark, supra, at 14.  Justice Clark circulated his 
opinion on June 11, and it quickly gained a five-man majority, with Chief Justice Warren predict-
ing that it would “without doubt be a classic.”  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL 
WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT — A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 523 (1983). 
  As all this was happening inside the Court, there was a breakthrough in the Senate.  A bi-
partisan coalition had broken the three-month-old filibuster the day before Justice Clark circulated 
his draft.  Justice Stewart then defected from Justice Black’s no-longer-majority opinion on June 
16.  But he did not make a U-turn on the merits by joining Justice Clark.  Instead, Justice Stewart 
helped Justice Brennan cobble together a new five-man majority (Justices Warren, Douglas, and 
Clark joined them) that disposed of Bell on procedural grounds and deferred the constitutional 
questions raised by the new Act until Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung.   
  Justice Brennan’s opinion ultimately prevailed, but Justice Clark’s draft opinion for the 
Court demonstrates that, when it seemed imperative, there were five votes for extending Shelley’s 
broad view of state action and rejecting the authority of the Civil Rights Cases on issues involving 
public accommodations. 
 137 At the Court’s conference on Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, Harlan unequivocally 
stated, “On the Fourteenth Amendment, I would stand by the Civil Rights Cases and hold [the 
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vided a platform for every racist in the nation to urge a new round of 
defiance against the 1964 Act’s effort to inaugurate a new era of race 
relations in this country.138 
Here is where New Deal constitutionalism came to the rescue.  Nei-
ther Justice Harlan nor anybody else was prepared to dissent from an 
opinion upholding the Act on the basis of an expansive New Deal read-
ing of the Commerce Clause.  The Court’s unanimity achieved its ob-
jective: it deprived bitter-end racists of any semblance of judicial  
support.139 
But the Court’s embrace of the Commerce Clause also serves to 
frame my main thesis: at the greatest egalitarian moment in our history, 
the Supreme Court of the United States treated a landmark statute as if 
it involved the sale of hamburger meat in interstate commerce, leaving 
it to Martin Luther King, Jr., and Lyndon Johnson to elaborate the na-
ture of the nation’s constitutional commitments.140  To learn the real 
constitutional reasons for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we must admit 
the landmark statute itself into the constitutional canon and treat the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Civil Rights Act of 1964] unconstitutional.”  THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–
1985), at 727 (Del Dickson ed., 2001); see also TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN 253 (1992) (“Justice Harlan undoubtedly would have been unwilling to support the 
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment’s use in an assault on private discrimination.”).  
 138 During the early 1950s, Chief Justice Warren could afford to take a lot of time to gain una-
nimity for Brown.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678–99 (1976).  No other major 
institution was forcing the Court’s hand on racial matters, and it was entirely up to the Justices to 
decide whether or not to push the equal protection question to the forefront of the nation’s consti-
tutional agenda.  (This is why I describe Brown as discharging the signaling function, and nothing 
more.)  But by 1964, the popular sovereignty dynamic had moved on and the Court was no longer 
in control of events — the legitimacy of the Civil Rights Act had now been reinforced by a sweep-
ing mandate from the People in November, and now that the voters had decisively rejected Gold-
water, a lengthy delay by the Court would have generated widespread uncertainties about the 
Act’s constitutionality, thereby endowing bitter-end efforts to defend Jim Crow on the ground with 
some legitimacy.   
 139 Technically speaking, Justice Clark’s opinions for the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and 
McClung were not unanimous, since Justice Black filed a special concurrence.  See Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 268–278 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (opinion 
also made applicable to McClung).  But from the doctrinal point of view, Justice Black’s concur-
rence disposes of the cases using precisely the same Commerce Clause theories elaborated by Jus-
tice Clark.  Justices Douglas and Goldberg also filed concurrences that relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an alternative ground, but neither took the trouble to write a serious analysis of the 
Civil Rights Cases, referring instead to their separate opinions in previous cases.  See id. at 279 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 140 Justice Clark appeared almost embarrassed in discussing the moral foundations of the Act.  
He explained in Heart of Atlanta Motel that congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause 
is “no less valid” when it is “legislating against moral wrongs.”  Id. at 257.  While the motel was 
located close to an interstate highway, the restaurant involved in McClung was off the beaten track 
for out-of-state travelers, and it was here where Justice Clark found it necessary to emphasize that 
“the restaurant purchased locally approximately $150,000 worth of food, $69,683 or 46% of which 
was meat that it bought from a local supplier who had procured it from outside the State.”  
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1964). 
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history of its enactment with the same respect that we give to the de-
bates surrounding the formal amendments of the first Reconstruction. 
I shall return to this point, but for the moment, let’s indulge a very 
different thought experiment and imagine that the Court had gone to 
the opposite extreme: instead of evading the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 
with a Commerce Clause opinion, it squarely confronted the question 
of stare decisis.  But under my hypothetical scenario, the majority flat-
out refused to repudiate the constitutional legacy of the nineteenth cen-
tury.  When forced to choose between stare decisis and the new land-
mark statute, the Court came down on the side of tradition, striking 
down large portions of the Civil Rights Act — just as Barry Goldwater 
had hoped.141 
This act of judicial resistance would have transformed the political 
landscape.  Instead of advancing the civil rights agenda as part of the 
Great Society vision outlined in his State of the Union Address,142 
Johnson would have been obliged to respond emphatically to the 
Court’s defiance of the popular will — through either court-packing or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 Suppose that the Rehnquist/Roberts Court had been propelled into the 1960s by the magical 
operation of a time machine.  Then, my scenario would have been anything-but-hypothetical.  The 
current Court has emphatically embraced the Civil Rights Cases: 
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind [the Civil Rights Cases] stems not only 
from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from the insight attribut-
able to the Members of the Court at that time.  Every Member had been appointed by 
President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur — and each of their judicial ap-
pointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000).  
  Today’s Court is more nuanced in its embrace of stare decisis when it comes to the superpre-
cedents of the New Deal era, like Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  Chief Justice Warren was emphatic in his embrace of New Deal juris-
prudence, assuring his brethren at the Conference for Heart of Atlanta Motel that “Congress need 
make no findings.  The commerce power is adequate [to uphold the Civil Rights Act].”  Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren, Statement at Conference of October 5, 1964, in THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (1940–1985), supra note 137, at 726.  In contrast, the majority in Morrison was 
unimpressed by the economic data collected by Congress, and struck down the Violence Against 
Women Act under the Commerce Clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 614–17.  
  A mechanical application of Morrison might lead today’s Court to overrule McClung, if not 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, but there is little chance of this happening in the foreseeable future.  While 
the Roberts Court may continue to nibble around the edges of Darby and Wickard, the odds are a 
million to one that it will continue to acknowledge McClung, as well as Heart of Atlanta Motel, as 
a superprecedent.  
 142 WOODS, supra note 129, at 558.  Even after his State of the Union, Johnson was reluctant to 
make the Voting Rights Act a high priority until King’s movement activities at Selma pushed the 
question into the center of political consciousness.  Only then did Johnson reach the high point of 
his movement-presidency in his great speech before Congress, urging the enactment of the new 
initiative, with the climactic endorsement of the movement’s watchword, “We Shall Overcome.”  
See DALLEK, supra note 101, at 212–19 (describing how Johnson’s initial low priority was over-
come by King’s activities in Selma); see also KOTZ, supra note 89, at 311 (recounting a portion of 
Johnson’s speech).  
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a formal constitutional amendment.  As in the New Deal–Old Court 
scenario, the Supreme Court’s resistance would have led the President 
and Congress to dissipate a great deal of the political capital generated 
by their landslide victory on election day.143  With the Supreme Court 
encouraging renewed white resistance, it would have been tough for 
Martin Luther King, Jr., to sustain his nonviolent leadership as rioting 
broke out in black ghettos throughout the nation.144  With both John-
son and King on the defensive, it’s hard to believe that any proposal 
for a constitutional amendment could have gained the support of three-
fourths of the states, as required by Article V. 
Under this originalist scenario, Americans in the 1960s might well 
have failed to translate the heroic engagements of the civil rights 
movement into a series of landmark statutes expressing the American 
people’s new commitments to political, social, and economic equality.  
But thanks to the Supreme Court’s New Deal deference, the move-
ment-presidency won its race against time, following up the initial Civil 
Rights Act with the Voting Rights Act of 1965145 and the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968.146 
Nevertheless, it was still within the power of the American people 
to use the election of 1968 to call the emerging commitment to racial 
equality into serious question.  George Wallace was a serious candidate 
in a three-man race, and he didn’t have to win to provoke a period of 
anxious reappraisal.  It would have sufficed for him to collect enough 
electoral votes to throw the election into the House, and then make a 
deal to give Richard Nixon the presidency in exchange for a dramatic 
rollback of civil rights legislation.  No less importantly, Nixon could 
have tried to preempt this Wallace threat by calling for a revision of the 
landmark statutes, thereby attracting millions of Wallace voters into his 
column. 
But nothing of the sort happened.  Nixon’s moment of truth came 
in October 1968, as public opinion polls revealed that Hubert Hum-
phrey was making a dramatic comeback.  But Nixon refused to pander 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 143 Roosevelt’s court-packing debacle was never far from Johnson’s mind: “LBJ [was] resolved 
not to waste his political capital with Congress, as FDR had done with the submission of his ill-
fated court-packing bill in 1937.”  SAVAGE, supra note 104, at 247.  Savage fails to note that Roose-
velt did not think he had a choice — if he had not threatened court-packing, he would have run 
the risk that his Second New Deal would go down in smoke.  Like it or not, Johnson would have 
been equally obliged to “waste his political capital” if the Court had struck down large parts of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 144 See DALLEK, supra note 101, at 232–37. 
 145 Peter Shane’s brilliant analysis of the Voting Rights Act is the appropriate starting point for 
further reflection on the landmark statute’s claims to a central place in the constitutional canon.  
See Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the “Statutory Constitution,” 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 243 (1993).  To my knowledge, nothing comparable has been written on the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act. 
 146 Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73. 
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to the racist vote147: although he ran a “law and order” campaign that 
expressed the popular revulsion at the riots and violence of the late 
1960s, he expressly supported the landmark statutes passed during the 
Johnson presidency.  At about the same time, Wallace’s popular sup-
port peaked at twenty-one percent, but then declined rapidly, leaving 
Nixon the clear winner in the Electoral College.148  Though Nixon was 
not demanding further great leaps forward, he wasn’t moving back-
ward in the manner of Barry Goldwater, let alone George Wallace.149  
His electoral victory served to complete the ratification process, ending 
serious political debate over the landmark statutes. 
Civil rights legislation did not come to a halt during the next few 
years, but Nixon did not make it a central priority.150  As the civil 
rights movement splintered after King’s assassination, politics returned 
to a more normal key — with liberal congressional leaders cutting deals 
with a President who had many more important concerns.  The days of 
a movement-presidency speaking in the name of the People were past, 
but this should not conceal the Nixon Administration’s accomplishment 
in consolidating the landmark statutes — both by supporting further 
legislation151 and by sustaining bureaucratic momentum in the en-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 See, e.g., THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at 363, 372 
(1969) (noting that Nixon denied himself the racist vote, fearing that its explicit embrace would 
undermine his effectiveness as a presidential leader if he won the election). 
 148 See id. at 347; see also David Leip, 1968 Presidential Election Results, in DAVID LEIP’S 
ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (2005), http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
national.php?year=1968 (showing that George Wallace won 13.5% of the national vote). 
 149 Nixon’s civil rights rhetoric in 1968 was distinctly moderate.  He opposed busing but prom-
ised to “enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights act.”  NIXON-AGNEW CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, 
NIXON ON THE ISSUES 98 (1968); see also NIXON-AGNEW CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, NIXON 
SPEAKS OUT 59 (1968) (citing “a decade of revolution in which the legal structure needed to guar-
antee equal rights has been laid in place”). 
  Nixon’s moderation contrasts with George Wallace’s campaign rhetoric.  Wallace called for 
“modifications in the Civil Rights Bill,” which was “not in the interests of any citizen of this coun-
try, regardless of their race.”  GEORGE C. WALLACE, “HEAR ME OUT” 18 (1968).  He also con-
tinued to preach segregation.  See id. at 118 (“[I]f we amalgamate into the one unit as advocated 
by the Communist philosophy, then the enrichment of our lives, the freedom for our development 
is gone forever.  We become, therefore, a mongrel unit . . . .”).  
 150 Though Nixon commissioned a series of policy task forces to establish an agenda for his first 
hundred days in office, there was no “task force on civil rights per se, none on equal employment 
opportunity, or on school desegregation or voting rights.”  GRAHAM, supra note 119, at 305.  
 151 For present purposes, Nixon’s position on the Voting Rights Act is most important.  When it 
was enacted in 1965, it had a five-year term, was focused entirely on the South, and had an imme-
diate impact: in 1964, only 35.5% of the black voting-age population in the South was registered; 
by 1969, this figure had increased to 64.8%.  Progress in the Deep South was even more impres-
sive: in Alabama, the proportion increased from 19.3% to 61.3%; in Georgia, from 27.4% to 60.4%; 
in Louisiana, from 31.6% to 60.8%; in South Carolina, from 37.3% to 54.6%; and in Mississippi, 
from 6.7% to 66.5%.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1970, at 369, available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1970-05.pdf. 
  Given these striking successes, the Nixon Administration might have declared that the Act 
had accomplished its mission and that it should be allowed to lapse at the end of its five-year term.  
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forcement effort.  By 1972, the Nixon Administration had transformed 
the law on the books into irreversible realities on the ground.  Although 
the Administration fell short of some liberal demands,152 it embraced 
others — including affirmative action — with remarkable vigor.153 
All in all, the Administration’s success in consolidating the new re-
gime was very substantial when judged by the relevant historical 
benchmark.  At a comparable stage in the First Reconstruction, the 
Grant Administration was transparently failing to follow through on 
the promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.154  But this 
was not happening the second time around — the law on the books 
was becoming a powerful reality throughout the land.  Constitutional 
consolidation was as complete as it ever gets. 
There is no need to exaggerate.  I do not suggest that today’s Amer-
ica has put its race problems behind it.  But compared to the First Re-
construction, the Second should be considered a relative success.  When 
Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois confronted the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments at the dawn of the twentieth century, they could only 
view them as grim parodies of constitutional pretension.  We stand at 
the same distance from the civil rights era, but the landmark statutes 
endure as a central reality of the living Constitution, and that is no 
small matter. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
But instead the Administration proposed a five-year renewal.  No less importantly, the Nixon Ad-
ministration spearheaded the nationalization of the Act’s scope to encompass all the states of the 
Union.  See GRAHAM, supra note 119, at 335.  This greatly enhanced the principled foundation of 
the statute, making it clear that it was not a passing element in a regional vendetta, but a funda-
mental commitment to the broad-based, and bureaucratically effective, pursuit of equality in vot-
ing.  
 152 The most notable shortfall involved school busing, which Nixon had opposed in 1968, see 
supra p. 1783 and note 149, and continued to oppose throughout his presidency, most notably by 
appointing four Justices to the Court who went on to create a new majority coalition that rolled 
back busing in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  See also RICHARD M. NIXON, BUSING 
AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-195, at 1–16 (1972).  
Nevertheless, Southern schools continued desegregating throughout Nixon’s term, reaching higher 
levels of integration than in the North.  See JOAN HOFF, NIXON RECONSIDERED 89–90 (1994) 
(noting that the Nixon administration found itself “producing an impressive statistical record on 
school desegregation,” lowering the Southern and national rates to eight and twelve percent respec-
tively).     
 153 The Nixon Administration pushed affirmative action far beyond anything contemplated un-
der Johnson or Kennedy, especially in the area of employment.  See GRAHAM, supra note 119, at 
342. 
 154 See FONER, supra note 50, at 557–62 (describing retreat during later years of the Grant Ad-
ministration); WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869–1879, at 25–55, 
166–86 (1979) (same).  
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We have been putting the Civil Rights Revolution in historical per-
spective, exploring its relationships to past cycles of popular sover-
eignty — most notably Reconstruction and the New Deal.  This has al-
lowed us to pinpoint differences, as well as similarities: beginning with 
the way that the Court, rather than the presidency, served as the key 
signaling institution; then how an assassin’s bullet gave constitutional 
leadership to a movement-presidency in the 1960s, instead of a move-
ment-Congress as in the 1860s; and finally how New Deal precedents 
allowed Lyndon Johnson to claim a Rooseveltian mandate from the 
People in 1964 and permitted the Supreme Court to defer to this popu-
lar mandate in upholding the Civil Rights Act. 
Each of these contrasts is worthy of more reflection.  But I want to 
focus on a key difference that can easily escape attention, because it in-
volves the dog-that-didn’t-bark.  From the time of Thomas Jefferson to 
the days of Franklin Roosevelt, the principal agent of popular sover-
eignty in America has been the movement-party.  But the civil rights 
era was different: We most definitely observe a movement, led by Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., and ultimately supported by millions of followers, 
both black and white, throughout the nation.  But we definitely don’t 
see a party that served as the political vehicle for this movement.  The 
Democratic Party left by Franklin Roosevelt had a split personality — 
with liberal Northerners and racist Southerners in an uneasy political 
coalition.  And the same was true of the Republicans — with anti–New 
Dealers like Barry Goldwater rejecting civil rights initiatives that were 
perfectly acceptable to “Modern Republicans” like Richard Nixon and 
Senate Republican leader Everett Dirksen.  This split between the 
movement and the party system made the translation of constitutional 
politics into constitutional law an especially tricky business. 
Most obviously, it was particularly difficult for the movement to 
pressure the President and Congress into embarking on an ambitious 
legislative program, since this would generate severe political tensions 
that might rip both parties into shreds.  This meant that a great deal 
would depend on the movement leadership’s political skills — and 
most notably on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s mix of high Gandhian prin-
ciple and shrewd media politics.  King planned his Southern campaigns 
with the aim of provoking horrendous television images of racist bru-
tality.155  These dramatic pictures shocked the national conscience in a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 As King explained in the Saturday Review, his aim in organizing nonviolent demonstrations 
at Selma was to provoke violence and force the nation to witness scenes of police brutality, thereby 
calling “Americans of conscience” to “demand federal intervention and legislation.”  Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Behind the Selma March, SATURDAY REV., Apr. 3, 1965, at 16; see also KLARMAN, su-
pra note 78, at 429; Laurie Hayes Fluker, The Making of a Medium and a Movement: National 
Broadcasting Company’s Coverage of the Civil Rights Movement, 1955–1965 (May 1996) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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way that mere words had never done and could never do — encourag-
ing racial liberals of both parties to take the high road on civil rights.156 
To put the point in a single line, King used media-politics as an al-
ternative to a movement-party as an engine for higher lawmaking — 
and it worked.  But there were dangers lurking.  King was making 
himself hostage to the calculations of the media business: if TV produc-
ers believed that black militants made for better broadcasts, King’s 
version of nonviolence could readily be overwhelmed by the scenes of 
the Watts riots.  Although movement-parties also lose momentum over 
time, they don’t lose it nearly as quickly as media-politicians. 
The absence of a movement-party also caused serious problems for 
ordinary voters.  If Americans didn’t approve the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1866 or the New Deal in 1936, they could simply throw the 
party of constitutional reform out of office and hand the government 
over to the party seeking to preserve the old regime.  But things were 
more complicated in the 1960s: when the Southern Democrats launched 
the longest filibuster in Senate history against the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the cooperation of Senate Republican leader Everett Dirksen was 
absolutely central in gaining the requisite two-thirds majority needed to 
close off the filibuster and enact landmark legislation.157  If, however, a 
“Modern Republican” like Dirksen or Nelson Rockefeller had gained 
the Republican presidential nomination in 1964, the voters would have 
been deprived of the clear yes-or-no choice provided by the nomination 
of Barry Goldwater. 
But as luck would have it, the right kind of Republican came to the 
fore at the right moments in the higher lawmaking process — Dirksen 
joining with the Democrats to pass the Civil Rights Act, Goldwater 
presenting a clear choice in 1964, and Richard Nixon supporting the 
new regime in 1968 and consolidating it thereafter. 
And yet, it could have turned out very differently.  The nation’s 
hopes for a new beginning in race relations might have been over-
whelmed by race riots, party bickering, and legislative impasse.  The 
absence of a movement-party placed an extraordinarily heavy burden 
on particular acts of political leadership to push the process onward to 
a collective sense of resolution.  The paradoxical combination of Earl 
Warren, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Lyndon Johnson, Everett Dirksen, Barry Goldwater, and Richard 
Nixon had somehow allowed the American people to organize a mean-
ingful process by which they could debate and decide on their constitu-
tional course.  Despite the challenges and tragedies, Americans had 
managed to transcend the pettiness of politics, and the chaos of mass 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 See KLARMAN, supra note 78, at 421–42.    
 157 See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 77–86 (1992). 
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action, to affirm their support for a series of landmark statutes that 
broke the back of Jim Crow in this country. 
The question is whether we are equal to the lesser challenge of hon-
oring this collective achievement by admitting these landmarks into the 
constitutional canon for the twenty-first century.  The partisans of the 
formalist Constitution trivialize the civil rights era.  As we have seen, 
the formal text does not mark it out as a period of great constitutional 
creativity, and, so far as they are concerned, that is that.  Instead, they 
tell a Whiggish story portraying the 1960s as merely fulfilling the con-
stitutional commitments made a century before.158 
My aim has been to provide common law tools that will permit the 
profession to recognize the Second Reconstruction for what it was — 
one of the greatest acts of popular sovereignty in American history.  In 
making their grand refusal, the formalists are worshipping at the shrine 
of John Wilkes Booth.  They fail to appreciate that it was Booth’s bul-
let that disrupted the standard pattern of presidential leadership that 
has been at the heart of constitutional politics since the age of Jeffer-
son.  If Booth had missed his mark in Ford’s Theatre, the formal Con-
stitution would never have been amended to include the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, 
the Republicans would have spent the next few years elaborating the 
constitutional meaning of citizenship and equality largely through 
landmark statutes and judicial superprecedents. 
In other words, it is the 1860s, not the 1960s, that represent the his-
torical oddity in constitutional development.  The civil rights era is 
simply one more variation on the great theme of presidential leader-
ship, with movement support, for constitutional change in the name of 
the American people.  The legal landmarks emerging from this moment 
of popular sovereignty should not be denigrated merely because they 
took the form of statutes rather than formal amendments. 
To be sure, the leading principles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
could be repealed by a simple majority of Congress, if supported by the 
President.  But this is also true of Marbury v. Madison: a sufficiently 
determined national majority could decisively undermine the current 
practice of judicial review.  Yet this formal point does not deprive 
Marbury of a canonical place in our tradition.  As with Marbury, we all 
recognize that an all-out assault on the Civil Rights Act, or the Voting 
Rights Act, could not occur without a massive effort comparable to the 
political exertions that created these landmarks in the first place.159  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 See infra Lecture Three. 
 159 The recent congressional decision to extend the Voting Rights Act for twenty-five years is 
especially notable.  Some Republican conservatives campaigned for a short-term extension, but the 
Administration insisted on making a generational commitment, leading a very conservative Con-
gress to give resounding support to a statute that has become a constitutional landmark, as sug-
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This suffices for my argument.  I have no interest in constructing a 
constitutional canon for eternity.  It is hard enough to define one that 
makes sense at the dawn of the twenty-first century.  I do not stand be-
fore you with a crystal ball: if some future generation does indeed make 
the collective effort to repeal the landmarks of the 1960s, it will then be 
living in a different constitutional world, and it will have to define a 
very different canon for itself.  It is enough for us to do justice to our 
own past and present a canon worthy of it to our successors. 
The final Lecture probes more deeply into the jurisprudential foun-
dations of my proposal, but I conclude this one with a more lawyerly 
argument, based on Brown v. Board of Education.  As we have seen, 
Senator Specter was right to call it a superprecedent160: any lawyer or 
judge who questions Brown’s legitimacy places himself outside the 
jurisprudential mainstream.  Yet this uncontroversial truth is all I need 
to make my point: when we consider the factors that led to the canoni-
zation of Brown, we will find that they equally support the canoniza-
tion of the landmark statutes of the 1960s. 
Call it my “horse and cart” argument, and it begins by noting the 
long delay before Brown achieved its canonical status.161  It was in 
1959, for example, that Herbert Wechsler rose to challenge Brown’s le-
gitimacy in one of the more famous Holmes Lectures.162  Wechsler’s 
critique was mild, even tentative, compared to the extravagant consti-
tutional claims made in the Southern Manifesto.163  Yet his lawyerly 
questions generated a wave of professional anxiety.  Only a year before, 
in its Little Rock decision, the Court had tried to silence further main-
stream debate by asserting that it was “supreme in the exposition . . . of 
the Constitution” and that the time had come for all law-abiding 
Americans to obey its Brown decrees.164  And yet here was a leading 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
gested by its new title: Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577.  The measure 
passed by a vote of 390 to 33 in the House, 152 CONG. REC. H5207 (2006), and unanimously in 
the Senate, 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (2006); see also Hamil R. Harris & Michael Abramowitz, Bush 
Signs Voting Rights Act Extension, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006, at A3 (detailing administration 
enthusiasm for the measure despite GOP resistance in the House). 
 160 See supra note 33. 
 161 Sometimes cases do become canonical the minute they are decided: Wickard and Darby pro-
vide obvious examples.  But these cases were decided at the final, or consolidation, stage of the 
New Deal, while Brown was handed down at the initial, or signaling, stage of the civil rights era.  
See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 373–75. 
 162  See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1959). 
 163 See 102 CONG. REC. 4515 (1956) (“The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the 
public school cases is now bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked power for 
established law.”). 
 164 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  To enhance its effort at auto-canonization, the 
Court’s decision ostentatiously wrapped Brown in the mantle of Marbury and then interpreted 
Marbury as establishing judicial supremacy.  See id.  For a dissenting view on Marbury, see 
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liberal law professor, speaking from the holy-of-holies at the Harvard 
Law School, insisting that the debate must continue.  Although 
Wechsler’s critique provoked quick and powerful responses from 
Brown’s defenders in the legal academy,165 the ongoing debate served 
to confirm Wechsler’s basic point: continuing dissent to Brown was not 
the monopoly of segregationist bitter-enders, but was a serious option 
for mainstream professionals.  And so long as this was true, Brown 
could hardly qualify as a superprecedent, in Senator Specter’s sense. 
It was only as a result of the successful constitutional politics of the 
1960s that the profession finally moved beyond Wechsler’s doubts.  By 
the time Richard Nixon got into the White House, even conservatives 
such as William Rehnquist were no longer free to voice doubts that lib-
erals such as Wechsler had expressed a decade before — at least if they 
wished to gain Senate confirmation to the Supreme Court.166  Brown, 
in short, is a case involving retroactive canonization — and it is this 
point that sets the stage for my “horse and cart” argument. 
We put the cart before the horse when we treat Brown as a super-
precedent without recognizing that Brown’s canonization is a product 
of the very same popular sovereignty dynamic that gave us the land-
mark statutes.  More precisely, it was the movement-presidency of 
Lyndon Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr., that provided the horse-
power that drove the landmark statutes onto the books, and it was the 
election of the “Modern Republican” Richard Nixon that marked the 
decisive end to the Plessy era.  The retroactive canonization of Brown 
was merely the cart that the legal profession created in response to the 
self-conscious decision by the American people to inaugurate a new era 
of racial justice in this country. 
The Warren Court recognized this key point at the height of the 
movement-presidency, but it has grown dim with the passage of time.  
The Court’s moment of truth came in Katzenbach v. Morgan,167 its 
1966 decision upholding the Voting Rights Act.  As with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the new statute swept away a key Supreme Court 
precedent, Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,168 
which had upheld the administration of literacy tests under the Four-
teenth Amendment.  And as with the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 196–97 (reading Marbury in light of Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 
(1803)).  
 165 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421 (1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).  
 166 See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 
RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 414–46 (2000) (arguing that the turning point for Brown occurred during 
the course of Senate hearings on Richard Nixon’s Supreme Court nominations). 
 167 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 168 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
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sharply divided on the wisdom of overruling Lassiter — understanda-
bly so, since Lassiter had been decided in 1959, not in 1883, and so re-
quired an especially embarrassing institutional reversal.169 
The Court responded to its predicament in precisely the same way 
as in Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung: it upheld the landmark 
statute by devising a rationale that avoided the repudiation of its prior 
case law.  But this time around, the Court couldn’t conceal the poverty 
of its equal protection doctrine by escaping to the New Deal Commerce 
Clause.  From a New Deal perspective, upholding the new Civil Rights 
Act under the Commerce Clause was an easy matter; but even the most 
expansive New Dealer would have trouble with the notion that “com-
merce among the states” included the federal regulation of voting 
rights.  And so the Justices were obligated to take a different doctrinal 
route, and one which glimpsed — however imperfectly — the extent to 
which the Second Reconstruction was moving beyond the limited no-
tions of constitutional equality inherited from the First Reconstruction.  
To express this point, the Court adopted an expansive reading of the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, interpreting it as a 
grant to Congress of the power to ratchet up the constitutional re-
quirements of equal protection beyond the Court’s restrictive jurispru-
dence.170  Morgan’s expansive interpretation has, of course, been a 
source of perplexity amongst commentators and courts ever since.171  
But happily, I don’t need to get into the details to make my main point, 
which involves Morgan’s impact on the operational canon.  Whatever 
else it does or doesn’t mean, Morgan placed lawyers on notice that they 
must give respectful treatment to the constitutional judgments ex-
pressed in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, even when these were incom-
patible with the best judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of 1868.  This decision amounts to the canonization of the 
landmark statute, allowing its principles to trump those expressed by 
the formal amendments of the 1860s. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 169 Lassiter unanimously upheld the constitutionality of literacy tests, so long as they were ad-
ministered fairly.  The conference notes in Morgan suggest that five Justices were prepared to 
overrule Lassiter, but that seven were prepared to uphold the power of Congress, under Section 5, 
to trump the Court’s constitutional understanding of the limits of the Equal Protection Clause.  
See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985), supra note 137, at 827–28.  As with 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court chose the doctrinal path that maximized the size of the judicial 
majority prepared to give its support to the landmark statute. 
 170 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (noting that Section 5 “is a positive grant of legislative power 
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is 
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
 171 Important work stretches over the decades, from the early article, Robert A. Burt, Miranda 
and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81, to the recent essay, Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison 
and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 478 (2000). 
  
1792 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:1737  
But it has been downhill since 1966.  The critical retreat began with 
Washington v. Davis.172  In this case, the Burger Court famously re-
fused to give the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the canonical status that the 
Warren Court had granted the Voting Rights Act.  And more recently, 
the Court has been whittling away at Morgan in a series of controver-
sial decisions.173  Speaking as a court-watcher, I don’t think that the 
Roberts Court will be reversing these recent precedents anytime soon. 
But this Lecture hasn’t been about court-watching.  It is the open-
ing shot in the battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation, 
represented by the law students in my audience.  When your time 
comes to exercise legal authority in the name of the American people, 
you will have to work out your own master narrative of the constitu-
tional past.  You, and you alone, will decide whether to emphasize the 
First Reconstruction, the one that failed, while trivializing the Second 
Reconstruction, the one that succeeded.  You, and you alone, will de-
cide whether to persist in our present habit of worshipping the Court in 
Brown while disparaging the decision of the American people to heed 
the call of King and Johnson and decisively support the landmark stat-
utes of the 1960s. 
I urge you to correct the mistakes of the current Supreme Court.  
Even if your generation does come to recognize the achievements of the 
Second Reconstruction, constitutional law will never become a me-
chanical business.  Reasonable judges and lawyers will predictably dis-
agree about the best interpretation of the principles expressed in the 
landmark statutes, and they will disagree about the best way to weave 
the legacy of the 1960s into the larger fabric of American constitutional 
law.  Nevertheless, there is a big difference between a legal debate 
about the constitutional meaning of equality that gives starring roles to 
Congressman Bingham and Senator Sumner, and one that recognizes 
the centrality of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Lyndon Johnson to the 
living Constitution.  It is the difference between conjuring up the gray 
eminences of an ever-more-distant past and bearing witness to the 
voices of a generation whose struggle for popular sovereignty is coming 
to an end. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 172 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 173 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (“There is language in our 
opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan . . . which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in 
Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.”).  For a telling cri-
tique based on a theory of constitutional moments, see Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protec-
tion: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381 (2000).  For another 
probing, and fundamentally compatible, critique, see Post & Siegel, supra note 171, at 478. 
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We pass the torch of the living Constitution on to you, in the hope 
that it will still be flickering when you pass it on to your children as 
they prepare themselves for the challenges of American citizenship. 
III.  LECTURE THREE: THE CONVERSATION  
BETWEEN GENERATIONS 
Is the Constitution a machine or an organism?  These rival meta-
phors have dominated constitutional thought, but during different cen-
turies.  Our Enlightenment Founders gave us the machine that might 
tick-tock to eternity if only we followed the written instructions in the 
operating manual.174 
But this dream was shattered by the Civil War, and when Recon-
struction Republicans changed the machine’s operating instructions, 
their constitutional amendments were overwhelmed by the political 
and social realities they had tried to reshape.  The enormous Republi-
can effort to transform race relations through constitutional formalism 
turned out to be a miserable failure. 
The moment was ripe for intellectual reappraisal, and America’s 
universities were up to the task.  For the first time in their history, 
Harvard and Columbia were becoming centers of serious graduate and 
professional education, joining upstarts like Chicago and Johns Hop-
kins in their admiration of German Wissenschaft. 
The consequences for constitutional thought were profound.  Wood-
row Wilson’s Johns Hopkins doctoral dissertation, Congressional Gov-
ernment, waged all-out war on the machine metaphor.  The Federalist 
Papers, he explained, “were written to influence only the voters of 1788, 
[but] still, with a strange, persistent longevity of power, [they] shape the 
constitutional criticism of the present day, obscuring much of that de-
velopment of constitutional practice which has since taken place.”175  
Speaking for his academic generation, Wilson was determined to bring 
an end to benighted ancestor worship.  Serious people should stop 
fixating on the “literary” Constitution176 and focus on the organic 
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 174 Professor Michael Kammen provides the most comprehensive historical treatment of the ma-
chine metaphor in MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).  His book also recognizes the rise of the or-
ganicist critique, id. at 156–84, but fails to appreciate its fundamental character, noting merely that 
the organicist approach “that reached its apogee during the quarter century after 1890 has not yet 
disappeared,” id. at 170. 
 175 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 30 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
1981) (1885). 
 176 See id. (“The Constitution in operation is manifestly a very different thing from the Consti-
tution of the books.”).  Wilson was influenced by Walter Bagehot’s pathbreaking The English Con-
stitution, published in 1867: “An observer who looks at the living reality will wonder at the con-
trast to the paper description.  He will see in the life much which is not in the books; and he will 
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evolution of real-world patterns of authority.177 
Wilson’s book was a large success, greatly enhancing organicist le-
gal critiques that Holmes and Thayer were developing in and around 
the tiny academic enclave that was the Harvard Law School.178  For 
these founding fathers of modern constitutional thought, Darwinian 
evolution, not Newtonian mechanics, provided the intellectual key  
to the universe; their legal efforts were but a small part of a grand 
intellectual project to place human development in its evolutionary 
context.179 
Within this brave new world of academic scholarship, Madison cut 
a pathetic figure.180  He might have fancied himself the inventor of a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
not find in the rough practice many refinements of the literary theory.”  Id. (quoting WALTER 
BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 5 (Miles Taylor ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1867)). 
 177 Note Wilson’s use of organic metaphors in his scholarly declaration of independence from 
the Federalist Papers: 
It is, therefore, the difficult task of one who would now write at once practically and 
critically of our national government to escape from theories and attach himself to facts, 
not allowing himself to be confused by a knowledge of what that government was in-
tended to be, or led away into conjectures as to what it may one day become, but striving 
to catch its present phases and to photograph the delicate organism in all its characteris-
tic parts exactly as it is today; an undertaking all the more arduous and doubtful of issue 
because it has to be entered upon without guidance from writers of acknowledged au-
thority. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 178 Holmes explicitly adopts an evolutionist stance in his famous denunciation of legal logic in 
The Common Law, in which he writes:  
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it 
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics.  In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it 
tends to become. . . . The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corre-
sponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and 
machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very 
much upon its past. 
HOLMES, supra note 46, at 1–2 (emphasis added).  As will become clear, I endorse the italicized 
portion of Holmes’s statement.  Organicism is also evident in the works of Professor James Thayer.  
See, e.g., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1896); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 179 See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
54–55 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908) (“The government of the United States was constructed 
upon the Whig theory of political dynamics, which was a sort of unconscious copy of the Newto-
nian theory of the universe.  In our own day, whenever we discuss the structure or development of 
anything, whether in nature or in society, we consciously or unconsciously follow Mr. Darwin, but 
before Mr. Darwin, they followed Newton.”). 
 180 Douglass Adair perceptively describes Madison’s decline and fall:  
Madison was still “father” of the Constitution after Appomattox, for such tags once 
rooted in the textbooks seem impossible to eradicate; but he was a parent treated with in-
creasing disrespect — a parent to be apologized for — by the most authoritative com-
mentators who wrote on The Federalist and the Constitution between the Civil War and 
the end of the nineteenth century.  The most widely read biography of the Virginian writ-
ten during this period, Gay’s, treated him with contempt and scorn; Henry Adams, in the 
great history of Madison’s administration, etched his portrait of the President with the 
acid of irony.  Henry Cabot Lodge, P. L. Ford, and Goodwin Smith in the process of edit-
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new science of government, but his Constitution had merely succeeded 
in freezing American development at an especially unfortunate histori-
cal moment.  Misled by Montesquieu, Madison had supposed that the 
separation of powers was central to the British Constitution.181  But in 
fact Britain was already evolving in the direction of something better 
— modern parliamentary government with power concentrated in the 
House of Commons.  From the vantage of the late nineteenth century, 
there was no comparison between the vibrant debates of Gladstone and 
Disraeli in the House of Commons and the desultory exchanges be-
tween President Chester Arthur and congressional barons in the Amer-
ica of the Gilded Age.  Unfettered by a written constitution, the British 
were successfully expanding their suffrage at a time when America’s 
Fifteenth Amendment was becoming a dead letter.  Could there be any 
question that organic evolution, not mechanical checks-and-balances, 
was the path to the future?182 
By the turn of the century, Madison’s star had fallen so low that the 
American Hall of Fame ignored him when it opened in 1900 to honor 
the great statesmen of the past.183  Only in 1913 did his reputation be-
gin to recover, but in a paradoxical fashion: his writings became central 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ing The Federalist stole — the word is exact — twelve of the essays written by Madison 
and attributed them to Hamilton, who all these editors agreed was the greatest of the 
Founding Fathers. 
Douglass Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 75, 
79–80 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974) (citations omitted). 
 181 Holmes comments on Montesquieu’s mischaracterizations: 
[Montesquieu’s] England — the England of the threefold division of power into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial — was a fiction invented by him, a fiction which misled 
Blackstone and Delome. . . . “Living across the Atlantic, and misled by accepted doc-
trines, the acute framers of the Federal Constitution, even after the keenest attention, did 
not perceive the Prime Minister to be the principle executive of the British Constitution, 
and the sovereign a cog in the mechanism.” 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 250, 263 (1920) 
(quoting BAGEHOT, supra note 176, at 53).  Holmes’s harsh judgment has stood the test of time.  
See ROBERT SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 300–01 (1961) (describ-
ing Montesquieu’s misunderstandings).  
 182 As Woodrow Wilson put it, commenting on a book by Henry Cabot Lodge: 
Mr. Lodge is quite right in saying that the Convention, in adapting, improved upon the 
English Constitution with which its members were familiar, — the Constitution of 
George III. and Lord North . . . .  It could hardly be said with equal confidence, however, 
that our system as then made [in 1787] was an improvement upon that scheme of respon-
sible cabinet government which challenges the admiration of the world to-day, though it 
was quite plainly a marked advance upon a parliament of royal nominees and pensionar-
ies and a secret cabinet of “king’s friends.” 
WILSON, supra note 175, at 200–01.  
  Thayer’s admiration of British-style government is obvious in his famous essay on the ori-
gins and nature of American constitutionalism.  See Thayer, supra note 178, at 138 (proposing that 
a system without judicial review would require the legislature to consider more seriously whether 
proposed laws are unconstitutional); id. at 155 (suggesting that legislatures of countries with un-
written constitutions are more respectful of private rights). 
 183 See Adair, supra note 180, at 80. 
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in Charles Beard’s famous effort to drive the last nail into the Foun-
ders’ coffin.184  It’s hard to believe today, but Federalist 10 was not 
then considered one of Madison’s major accomplishments — after all, 
it is only a newspaper article written in haste during New York’s ratifi-
cation campaign.  But for a professional historian like Professor Beard, 
searching the archives for half-forgotten newspaper articles was pre-
cisely his business.  And in Professor Beard’s hands, Federalist 10 be-
came a smoking gun, exploding the hagiographic myths of the past.  
There it was, in black and white: Madison’s proud boast that the new 
Constitution would suppress “[a] rage for paper money, for an abolition 
of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or 
wicked project.”185  Professor Beard had taken a decisive step beyond 
Wilson: the Founders’ machine was not only obsolete, but it was origi-
nally intended to frustrate the aspirations of a modern democratic soci-
ety for social justice.186  The task for clear-thinking lawyers, judges, 
and Americans was obvious: it was time to move beyond ancestor wor-
ship and engage in the hard work of adapting antiquated constitutional 
arrangements to the felt necessities of the modern age. 
By the time Beard’s book became a publishing sensation, Wilson 
was President, and Holmes and Brandeis were on the Court challeng-
ing nineteenth-century orthodoxies.  But it was only during the New 
Deal that the new organicism triumphed decisively in our constitu-
tional law.  Roosevelt’s court-packing campaign was inspired by British 
precedents.  The President vividly recalled the days of his youth when 
the Asquith government in Great Britain had advanced a modern form 
of liberalism emphasizing social justice, only to confront a veto by the 
House of Lords.187  Prime Minister Asquith refused to retreat and in-
sisted on his democratic authority to deprive the Lords of their consti-
tutional veto over his plan to redistribute wealth from the rich to ordi-
nary Britons.  Asquith resolved the resulting crisis by obtaining a 
promise from the King to pack the Lords with enough Liberal peers to 
force it to surrender its veto on legislation.188 
In Roosevelt’s eyes, Asquith’s move served as an influential prece-
dent.  The Supreme Court was the American equivalent of the un-
elected House of Lords, and its obstructionism could be resolved by a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 184 See id. at 86–87.  Beard’s singular contribution was, of course, his materialistic critique of 
the Founding.  See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Transaction Publishers 3d ed. 2003) (1913). 
 185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 186 See BEARD, supra note 184, at 152–83. 
 187 See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 94–95 (1995).  FDR 
doesn’t seem to have gotten his facts straight, confusing efforts to pass a home rule bill for Ireland 
with Asquith’s effort to force the Lords to accept Lloyd George’s budget.  Id. 
 188 See ROY JENKINS, MR. BALFOUR’S POODLE 102–03, 178–79 (1954). 
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trans-Atlantic form of Lords-packing.189  When the smoke cleared, the 
American Constitution finally ended up in a very British place: Roose-
velt, like Asquith, had no need to make good on his court-packing 
threat.190  The Supreme Court adapted organically to the rise of mod-
ern liberalism by canonizing the New Deal constitutional vision in su-
perprecedents like Wickard and Darby.  The era of mechanical consti-
tutional amendments was over.191 
As America emerged from the Second World War, the seeds planted 
by Wilson and Beard, by Holmes and Brandeis, had grown into a 
mighty forest of case law and commentary.  For the overwhelming ma-
jority of leading thinkers — Frankfurter and Bickel, Hand and 
Wechsler, Jackson and Hart — one thing was clear: the Enlightenment 
Founders and their Reconstruction successors had simply failed to an-
ticipate, much less control, the unruly dynamics of American history.  
As Justice Jackson famously put it at the dawn of the modern era in 
Barnette192: 
The task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, con-
ceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth cen-
tury, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the 
twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence.  These principles grew 
in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was at the 
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of 
governmental restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few 
controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s affairs.  We must 
transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or princi-
ple of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and so-
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 189 See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 187, at 94–95 (noting recurring references to the British 
precedent in cabinet discussions).  Public references to the House of Lords controversy were com-
monplace.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 182 
(1941) (“Property interests . . . had come to regard the Supreme Court as their own House of Lords 
and to believe they had a moral right to control its sheltering veto.”). 
 190 For a major reinterpretation of the relationship between the American and British constitu-
tional traditions over the past two centuries, see Rivka Weill, We the British People, 2004 PUB. L. 
380; and Rivka Weill, Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
429 (2006). 
 191 Testifying in defense of court-packing at the Senate hearings, Assistant Attorney General 
Robert Jackson doubted whether any set of formal amendments could “offset the effect of the judi-
cial attitude reflected in recent decisions.”  Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 
1392 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 43 (1937).  As he put it: “It may be possible 
by more words to clarify words, but it is not possible by words to change a state of mind.”  Id.  His 
emphasis on organic adaptation is also a major theme in his classic book that, like the Federalist 
Papers, attempts a comprehensive interpretation of his generation’s constitutional achievement.  
See JACKSON, supra note 189, at 174 (“The [Old] Court had struck at the Constitution itself by 
denying to it the capacity of adaptation to ‘the various crises of human affairs.’  The greatest ex-
pounders of the Constitution, from John Marshall to Oliver Wendell Holmes, have always insisted 
that the strength and vitality of the Constitution stem from the fact that its principles are adapt-
able to changing events.”  (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819))). 
 192 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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cial advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of so-
ciety and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.  
These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliability and cast 
us more than we would choose upon our own judgment.  But we act in 
these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our 
commissions.193 
There is anxiety here, but also a certain confidence in organic judi-
cial development, nurtured by a scholarly tradition that now stretched 
back for more than half a century (and a common law tradition rooted 
in centuries of practice).  Organism had triumphed over mechanism: if 
the Constitution were to survive, judges had no real choice but to use 
their judgment to determine which constitutional traditions would sur-
vive the “transplant” onto modern American “soil.” 
Only Hugo Black dissented.  He had been a fierce champion of the 
court-packing plan in the Senate, and Roosevelt nominated him in 1937 
in a fit of pique after his initiative had been rejected.  The President 
wanted to show his contempt for his opponents by pushing a leading 
court-packer onto the Court.194  Shortly after his confirmation, Justice 
Black’s reputation suffered a further setback.  He was forced to make a 
humiliating confession on national radio when his lifetime membership 
card for the Ku Klux Klan suddenly became public.  Despite angry 
demands for Black’s resignation, Roosevelt refused to withdraw his 
support: his new Justice was a solid vote in support of New Deal  
legislation, and that was enough for the moment.195  Nobody suspected 
that America was getting a great civil libertarian, let alone a closet  
jurisprude. 
But Justice Black surprised them all.  As an autodidact, he devel-
oped his ideas in splendid isolation from the constitutional thinking of 
his time — Bible-Belt Protestantism, not Darwinian evolutionism, 
served as the intellectual backdrop for his constitutional philosophy.  If 
he had remained a Senator, he would have been a constitutional crank 
crying in the wilderness — but the luck of the draw had given him a 
platform to force a skeptical legal world196 to confront his self-
confident reassertion of mechanical jurisprudence. 
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 193 Id. at 639–40. 
 194 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 187, at 210–11 (“Far from seeking to placate Congress by 
picking a moderate . . . [Roosevelt’s] selection of Black was a symbolic and defiant act. . . . The 
Senate was even more a target for revenge, for it had just humiliated him in the Court-packing 
battle.  Donald Richberg, a prominent New Dealer, confided, Clapper noted, that ‘Roosevelt was 
mad and was determined to give Senate [sic] the name which would be most disagreeable to it yet 
which it could not reject.’”). 
 195 See id. at 188–99. 
 196 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (disparaging 
mechanical approaches to law). 
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As it happened, Justice Black’s version of originalism placed him on 
the right side of history: with barely a hint of irony, he opined that the 
Framers were emphatic defenders of free political speech, committed 
partisans of legislative reapportionment, and great believers in school 
desegregation.197  No serious historian would support such extrava-
gances, but the next cycle of academic research did serve Justice 
Black’s cause in the longer run.  A rising group of scholars like Gordon 
Wood and Eric Foner revised the dark picture of the Framers left be-
hind by Charles Beard’s generation.  They did not deny, of course, that 
the Founding Federalists feared redistribution198 or that the Recon-
struction Republicans believed in the free market.199  But they success-
fully refocused attention on more neglected aspects of the constitutional 
past, most notably the Founders’ revolutionary commitment to popular 
sovereignty and the Reconstruction Republicans’ radical commitment 
to racial equality.  While Justice Black defined his originalism long be-
fore these scholars’ views came to ascendancy in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the new historians served his larger cause by displacing the vigorous 
muckraking of the Progressive period with a more sympathetic treat-
ment of the Framers’ aims and ideals. 
The new historiography, together with Black’s heroic defense of 
freedom and equality, provides the evolving context for more recent ju-
dicial affirmations of the old-time religion.  Though liberals may de-
spair at the reactionary decisions of Justices Scalia or Thomas, they 
cannot forget — no matter how they try — that Hugo Black was the 
original originalist on the modern Supreme Court.  The Black-Scalia 
conjunction suggests that there may be something more to originalism 
than the political sloganeering of right-wing Republicans: perhaps it 
really is best to view the Constitution as a wonderful machine that will 
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 197 Compare, e.g., HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 49 (1968) (ex-
pounding Justice Black’s famously absolutist views on the “freedom of speech”), with Leonard W. 
Levy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) 
(making the extraordinary claim that one-man one-vote was “a principle tenaciously fought for 
and established at the Constitutional Convention”), with James A. Gazell, One Man, One Vote: Its 
Long Germination, 23 W. POL. Q. 445, 462 (1970) (“Although the framers and ratifiers knew about 
the system of representation by equally populated districts, only a small minority on record fa-
vored it . . . .”).   
  Justice Black also signed on to Brown despite its problematic relationship to the prevailing 
understandings of “equal protection” at Reconstruction.  See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). 
 198 See WOOD, supra note 47, at 626 (rejecting Beard’s narrow materialism, but asserting the 
continuing relevance of the Progressive interpretation of the Founding); see also JENNIFER 
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(1990). 
 199 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11 (1970) (“Political anti-slavery was not merely 
a negative doctrine . . . it was an affirmation of the superiority of . . . a dynamic, expanding capi-
talist society . . . .”).  
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propel us into the twenty-first century so long as the Justices remain 
faithful to its operating instructions? 
A similar suggestion was coming from abroad.  Under heavy 
American influence, Germany, Italy, and Japan sought national salva-
tion after wartime defeat through written constitutionalism.  But then 
the movement took on a life of its own, with India, France, the Euro-
pean Union, Eastern Europe and South Africa all embracing judi- 
cial review as a basic component in their (very different) schemes of 
government. 
A century ago, the Holmeses of America looked abroad to compare 
the triumph of organic development in Britain with the tragic failure of 
Reconstruction in America.  But today, the whole world seems to be 
designing constitutional machines to check and balance power in the 
name of human rights.200  It is ironic that Justice Scalia has chosen this 
moment to warn American lawyers against the intellectual temptations 
of comparative constitutionalism — the worldwide embrace of written 
constitutions provides powerful support for his claim that textualism is 
a serious jurisprudence, not merely political sloganeering.201 
It is one thing for South Africans or Germans to follow a constitu-
tion handed down a decade, or a half-century, ago;202 quite another for 
Americans to cling to an antique text that fails to mark any of the na-
tion’s recent achievements.  “[W]e must realize,” as Holmes himself re-
minds us, that our constitutional development 
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an or-
ganism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat 
and blood to prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of 
what was said a hundred years ago.203 
Justice Holmes wrote these words in 1920 — and surely they have 
not lost their force in 2006.  Nevertheless, the rise of the Black-Scalia 
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 200 To be sure, many of these mechanical efforts have been failures — with Iraq coming at the 
end of a long list of fiascos left in the wake of the retreat by Western imperial masters from direct 
control in the Third World.  But this dismal list should not divert attention from the many success-
ful efforts to stabilize liberal democracies with written constitutions.  
 201 There is an additional factor: the current generation of historians is more sympathetic to the 
aims of the Founders and Reconstructers than their Beardian predecessors of the Progressive Era.  
See supra pp. 1794–96. 
 202 This is not to say that the Germans, or other leading constitutional courts, have embraced 
anything like the mechanical jurisprudence of Justice Black or Justice Scalia.  To the contrary, 
teleological interpretation is the dominant technique.  See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 42 (2d ed. 
1997) (describing Germany’s “more open-ended approach to judicial decision making”); Peter Ler-
che, Stil und Methode der Verfassungsrechtlichen Entscheidungspraxis, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT 50 
JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 333 (Peter Badure & Horst Dreier eds., 2001). 
 203 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
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view over the past half-century has, paradoxically, made them seem 
more controversial.  It will not be enough for the next generation to de-
termine its jurisprudential destiny with a citation either to Justice 
Holmes or to Justice Black.  It will have to make up its own mind.  So 
what will it be: is the Constitution a machine or an organism? 
I say: “Neither.”  Both sides are half-right, and it is time to move 
beyond their rival half-truths and build a new foundation.  The party 
of Holmes is right to insist that our constitutional arrangements have 
changed in ways that our eighteenth- and nineteenth-century forbearers 
could not have begun to imagine.  But the party of Black is right to in-
sist that the Holmesians have packaged this insight in an unacceptably 
elitist form.  From the days of Holmes and Brandeis to those of Ken-
nedy and Souter, organicists have taken the common law method of 
adaptation to serve as their guide — slowly, by half steps, the common 
law judge senses the changing patterns of social mores and keeps the 
law in tune with life.  This common law turn is understandable, given 
the tradition’s central place in our legal culture.  But it does not do jus-
tice to the crucial importance of popular sovereignty in constitutional 
development.204 
The common law tradition was created by judges for judges.  While 
modern versions encourage judges to engage in a complex dialogue 
with their many publics, the judiciary remains firmly in the driver’s 
seat.  Within this framework, an opinion of the Court, like Marbury or 
Wickard or Brown, becomes a superprecedent when it is affirmed and 
reaffirmed by generations of judges despite the changing temper of the 
times.205 
This approach does permit adaptation and has an important place 
in our constitutional development.  But its judge-centered character 
slights the central importance of popular sovereignty.  The party of 
Holmes does not seek to determine when the People have spoken, what 
they have tried to say, or how these acts of popular sovereignty can re-
main relevant in a changing world.  It asks what judges have said in 
the past, which judgments have stood the test of time, and which  
require further judicial adaptation to keep up with changing social  
mores.206 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 See generally BLACK, supra note 197; Scalia, supra note 40.  
 205 Justice Alito elaborated this court-centered theory of superprecedent at his hearings.  See 
Alito, supra note 33, at 455 (“[T]here is wisdom embedded in decisions that have been made by 
prior Justices who . . . are scholars and are conscientious, and when they examine a question and 
they reach a conclusion, I think that’s entitled to considerable respect, and of course, the more 
times that happens, the more respect the decision is entitled to . . . .”). 
 206 The leading spokesmen for the common law approach, in its many variations, seem to reside 
in Chicago.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing 
for judicial pragmatism in formulating doctrine); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (arguing for judicial minimalism in 
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In contrast, the party of Black is right to insist that the Constitu-
tion’s authority is generated by the mobilized and self-conscious com-
mitments of We the People.  And yet the Blackians’ narrow focus on 
the formal amendment mechanism described in Article V gives an 
anachronistic twist to their professions of faith.  While they speak  
endlessly about the primacy of popular sovereignty, they trivialize the 
central twentieth-century texts that codify the great triumphs of mod-
ern constitutional politics.  Instead of interpreting these landmark stat-
utes and superprecedents with sympathetic attention, they endlessly 
debate the meaning of the merest jottings from the Founding and  
Reconstruction. 
We have reached, then, my promised moment of half-truth, or bet-
ter, half-truths: The party of Hugo Black celebrates the principle of 
popular sovereignty but trivializes the modern achievements of the 
American people.  The party of Oliver Wendell Holmes recognizes that 
the living Constitution has moved far beyond the Founding and Recon-
struction, but it trivializes the principle of popular sovereignty. 
I have been offering a way out.  If we expand the twenty-first-
century canon to add the decisive texts of the New Deal and the civil 
rights era to those of the Founding and Reconstruction, we no longer 
must choose between an antiquarian approach to popular sovereignty 
and a court-centered approach to modernity.  By expanding the canon, 
the profession can develop the contemporary meaning of our Constitu-
tion after confronting all the great legal texts generated by all the great 
acts of popular sovereignty in our history.  In taking this step, lawyers 
will enable their fellow citizens to define their own place in an ongoing 
constitutional tradition that did not end with the Founding, or Recon-
struction, but will continue until the death of the Republic. 
A professional effort to redefine the canon will also pay off when we 
get down to the business of deciding cases.  Despite their protestations 
to the contrary, neither Blackians nor Holmesians actually practice 
what they preach.  Though mechanists pretend that they can derive 
compelling decisions exclusively from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century texts, they unpredictably swerve whenever contrary precedents 
seem too overwhelming.  Though organicists emphasize the wisdom of 
adapting existing case law to contemporary realities, they typically 
make half-hearted gestures toward one or another clause to appease the 
ancient spirits of the Framers.  Judges on both sides display too much 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the elaboration of doctrine); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he common law approach restrains judges more ef-
fectively, is more justifiable in abstract terms than textualism or originalism, and provides a far 
better account of our practices”); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of 
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).   
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common sense to embrace the harsh dichotomies of their competing 
philosophies. 
Yet both sides obscure their concessions through the use of legal fic-
tions.  As Professor Lon Fuller made clear in his classic study, legal fic-
tions aren’t merely falsehoods — they are falsehoods that are “not in-
tended to deceive.”207  Under the old writ system, everybody knew that 
Messrs. Doe and Roe were not suing in ejectment and that places like 
Jamaica were not (as the bill of Middlesex would have it) located in 
Cheapside.  Nevertheless, these fictions offered the only way of achiev-
ing sensible results within a formalist legal culture that refused to re-
form itself. 
The same dis-ease currently afflicts American constitutional law.  
Our most important fiction involves the pervasive use of “myths of re-
discovery” to save both Blackians and Holmesians from reaching un-
reasonable results.  For starters, both mechanists and organicists pre-
tend that the Commerce Clause somehow legitimates the overwhelming 
expansion of national regulatory power since the New Deal revolu-
tion208 — although they embrace this fiction about the Founding for 
different reasons.  The mechanists indulge the myth because they fear a 
massive popular backlash if they wage all-out war against the modern 
regulatory state.  The organicists find the myth attractive because it 
gives them a defense against charges of judicial activism and permits 
them to continue with the serious business of adapting the Founders’ 
obsolete notions of “commerce” to the felt necessities of the twenty-first 
century. 
A similar marriage of convenience obtains when it comes to the 
civil rights revolution.  Both sides converge on the proposition that 
Brown was not only rightly decided in 1954, but that “separate but 
equal” was never a constitutionally legitimate response to the problem 
of public education.  Once again, mechanists are willing to falsify the 
complexity of the original understanding because they fear a backlash 
if they question Brown,209 and organicists are happy to use Brown as a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 207 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 6 (1967).  Special thanks to John Langbein for encour-
aging me to reread Fuller. 
 208 On the mythic account, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch suffices to establish 
the modern regulatory state’s roots in the Founding.  But McCulloch did not fully anticipate con-
temporary realities, and it occupied an extreme point in a much larger conversation in the early 
Republic.  Indeed, the Taney Court was prepared to overrule McCulloch, if given an appropriate 
opportunity.  See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 49, at 71–73, 84–86; Mark A. Graber, Antebellum Per-
spectives on Free Speech, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 779, 808 n.161 (2002).  I further interro-
gate this myth in 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 43, at 34–57. 
 209 Responding to this embarrassment, Michael McConnell tries to legitimate Brown on original-
ist grounds.  See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 1131–40 (1995).  But this exercise in originalist theology has been decisively refuted by 
Michael Klarman.  See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).  
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springboard for further evolution of an egalitarian jurisprudence ap-
propriate to the changing mores of the twenty-first century. 
These myths of rediscovery exist in many variations, but it is more 
important to step back from the details and combine them together.  In 
this now-conventional story, judges lived through a Dark Age early in 
the twentieth century — lasting roughly through 1937 in the case of 
Lochner, and roughly through 1954 in the case of Plessy.210  During 
this Dark Age, the Court unaccountably failed to understand the true 
legal meaning of the Commerce, Equal Protection, and Due Process 
Clauses.  Then came Whiggish moments of Enlightenment: miracu-
lously, the Justices cast away their blinders to reveal the Constitutional 
Truth That Had Been There The Whole Time — and all has been ba-
sically right with the world ever since.211 
It will be tough to convince judges to give up this metanarrative.  
Not only is it sufficiently capacious to allow Blackians and Holmesians 
to continue their internecine battle for supremacy over the legal mind.  
Not only is it sufficiently flexible to allow judges of both persuasions to 
avoid decisions that offend common sense.  But it is ego gratifying as 
well: in this storyline, the problem with the Lochner and Plessy eras 
was that most judges didn’t have the wit to heed the emphatic dissents 
of Justices Holmes and Harlan.  But now that modern judges have 
learned the lessons of these great dissenters, they can afford to ignore 
anything that serious legal historians and political scientists may say 
about the reigning myths of rediscovery. 
My revisionary proposal, in contrast, puts the People, not the Court, 
at the center of constitutional development.  It insists that ordinary 
Americans, led by such figures as Franklin Roosevelt and Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., have made as large a constitutional contribution as the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 210 The terminating date of the Lochner era is a subject of endless debate — Professor Barry 
Cushman, for example, says it is either 1934 or 1941, but not 1937.  See BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).  The end date of the Plessy era has also been dis-
puted, with Professors Michael Klarman and Lucas Powe persuasively suggesting that the Plessy 
era ended in the early 1960s, not in the 1950s.  See KLARMAN, supra note 78, at 381 (“That litiga-
tion alone could not desegregate schools was clear by 1960 . . . .”); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 178 (2000) (noting the declining role of litigation in 
the desegregation movement by 1962).  For present purposes, these are just details.  The key point 
is that the dominant metanarrative has a Whiggish structure — a Dark Age yields to the present 
Age of Enlightenment.  
 211 I don’t expect the Roberts Court to challenge this storyline in a fundamental way.  Justice 
Thomas has famously called upon his colleagues to repudiate the New Deal myth of rediscovery. 
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although I may 
be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late 
in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.”).  But there is no indi-
cation that any other Justice is prepared to join him.  And while Brown itself recognizes its prob-
lematic roots in Reconstruction, even Justice Thomas hasn’t suggested that this should prompt a 
serious period of agonizing reappraisal by originalists.  But cf. McConnell, supra note 209, at 1131–
40 (seeking implausibly to ground Brown in the original understanding). 
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generations led by George Washington and Abraham Lincoln — and 
that the job of the Supreme Court is to recognize this point when mak-
ing sense of the living Constitution. 
When working with the expanded canon, the Supreme Court’s job 
is neither to defend the original understanding of the constitutional 
texts inherited from the Founding and Reconstruction, nor to ponder 
the complexities of the countermajoritarian difficulty raised by the elit-
ist character of common law constitutionalism.  Its task is to reflect 
upon all the principles affirmed by the American people, and to use 
these principles as a check and balance on the political pretensions of 
the present day.  When the Court strikes down a statute in the name of 
We the People of past generations, it certainly does force the politicians 
of the present to think twice before pressing forward in a direction that 
threatens foundational commitments. 
But it begs a big question to call the Court’s intervention antidemo-
cratic.  The begged question is this: have the politicians of today earned 
the special kind of authority that past spokesmen for the People gained 
only after a decade or more of intensifying public debate, institutional 
contestation, and self-conscious decision by the American people at the 
polls? 
Generally speaking, the answer will be an obvious “no.”  Most stat-
utes and executive decrees simply don’t proceed from the sustained de-
liberation typical of our great acts of popular sovereignty.  In the stan-
dard case, judicial review is best understood as a crucial resource in 
organizing a dialogue between generations: by striking down a statute, 
the judges are forcing Americans of today to take seriously the views of 
preceding generations, and to think harder before they revise the con-
stitutional principles affirmed by We the People of yesterday. 
This is not ancestor worship.  My case for a conversation between 
the generations is based on a realistic assessment of contemporary de-
mocratic life.  As public opinion research abundantly establishes, most 
Americans have better things to do than follow the zigs and zags of 
Washington debate.212  They are too deeply involved in too many other 
pursuits — from earning a living, to coaching Little League, to serving 
God’s will, to making sense of their personal lives. 
This opens up a large space for political representatives to pass laws 
that would never gain the public’s considered consent if it had been 
paying serious attention.  While there are practical reforms that might 
help improve the quality of participation in normal politics,213 I do not 
yearn for a never-never land in which most Americans become political 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 212 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 125, at 5–14. 
 213 See id. 
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junkies like you or me.214  Citizenship is only one of many activities 
that make modern life worth living — and much is lost, as well as 
gained, by yanking tens or hundreds of millions out of their ordinary 
lives to take part in a high-stakes political struggle over the future of 
American law. 
It is for good reason, then, that the typical American voter doesn’t 
view the typical American election as providing the winners with a 
sweeping mandate to destroy the greatest historical achievements of the 
American people.  If a political coalition has this ambition, it should 
not be allowed to achieve its aims through smoke and sound bites.  It 
should be prepared to confront Supreme Court opinions that explain 
why and how statutory initiatives offend the considered judgments of 
the People of the past.  It should be required to engage in a sustained 
effort to gain the mobilized support of today’s Americans to revise their 
constitutional legacy.  Only then will it have earned the constitutional 
authority to demand, in the name of the American people, that future 
courts admit new landmark statutes and superprecedents into the 
evolving constitutional legacy passed on to future generations. 
I don’t expect too much from my proposal.  If scholars, and ulti-
mately judges, build a new constitutional canon, the profession will be 
studying twentieth-century texts with the same high seriousness it ac-
cords ancient ones, but we won’t reach a single common understanding 
of the meaning of these texts, any more than we do today with our 
more restrictive canon.  It will remain for the Court to exercise judg-
ment, and prudence, in elaborating the contemporary significance of 
past acts of popular sovereignty. 
Sometimes the Justices will make serious mistakes, but these blun-
ders should be placed into a larger perspective.  Political life is full of 
pathologies: Presidents regularly claim strong mandates from the Peo-
ple that they can’t sustain in the court of public opinion; Senators and 
Representatives pander to special interests; campaign gurus blitz the 
airwaves with misleading and divisive appeals; and ordinary Ameri-
cans turn away in disgust at the meaningless sound bites and recurring 
scandals.  Amidst all these competing pressures, the President and 
Congress will sometimes dither, sometimes pass serious legislation that 
makes a genuine effort to define the public interest, and sometimes 
propel the country over a moral precipice.  Within this human-all-too-
human tragicomedy, the Court adds something valuable to the mix.  
Quite simply, the Justices are the only ones around with the training 
and the inclination to look back to past moments of popular sover-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 214 In contrast to my position, Professor Roberto Unger seems to endorse a political ideal that 
contemplates a constant commitment to high-energy politics.  See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA 
UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 213–20 (1998). 
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eignty, and to check the pretensions of our elected politicians when they 
endanger the great achievements of the past.215  By expanding the 
canon to include the twentieth century, the profession will be providing 
the courts with the intellectual resources needed to discharge the func-
tion of judicial review in a more thoughtful fashion. 
The legal effort to define the achievements of the twentieth century 
will also clarify our present constitutional situation.  Since September 
11th, we have witnessed yet another presidential effort to gain the sup-
port of the American people for a basic transformation of our constitu-
tional values in the name of the “war on terror.”  We won’t get very far 
in understanding this exercise by consulting the traditional categories of 
Article V.  These formalisms fail to envision any presidential role in the 
process of constitutional revision, much less the role that has developed 
organically from the times of Thomas Jefferson through the days of 
Lyndon Johnson.  But once we cast aside our formalist blinders, we can 
begin to treat our present situation in the spirit of the last Lecture — in 
which we tried to gain legal perspective on the civil rights movement 
by comparing its institutional dynamics to the most successful exercises 
in popular sovereignty of the past.216 
Recall the most important point: popular sovereignty is not a matter 
of a single moment; it is a sustained process that passes through a series 
of stages — from the signaling phase through culminating acts of popu-
lar decision to consolidation.  The first question to ask isn’t whether 
the movement–Republican Party of George W. Bush has already com-
pleted its constitutional revolution, but whether it has fairly begun: has 
it signaled to the American people that the time has come for a serious 
constitutional reappraisal? 
My answer is an unequivocal “yes.”  September 11th, by itself, did 
not constitute this signal — any more, say, than the stock market crash 
signaled the need for a New Deal.  Herbert Hoover was given three 
years before the next presidential election to show that his own ap-
proach was adequate to the Great Depression.  But he failed, and it 
was the election of 1932 that signaled decisive popular support for the 
consideration of a new constitutional agenda.  Like Herbert Hoover, 
George W. Bush was given three years to patch together an emergency 
response to a large and unforeseen crisis, but this time the voters did 
not throw him out.  To be sure, he didn’t win in a landslide, nor did 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 215 Alexander Bickel was exaggerating when he supposed that “[j]udges have, or should have, 
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends 
of government.”  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25–26 (1962).  
Most judges I know are far too busy to be serious scholars, but they are typically far more 
thoughtful on constitutional matters than most of the political types who inhabit the rest of our 
constitutional world.      
 216 See supra pp. 1757–93. 
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the Republicans carry Congress by New Deal margins.  But with the 
neoconservative movement in control of both the presidency and the 
Congress, the signal coming out of the 2004 elections was unmistak-
able: if Americans didn’t like the “war on terror” that was being pro-
posed in their name, they had better get their act together and do some-
thing about it. 
We are now at the proposal stage: as in the 1930s, the Supreme 
Court is beginning to challenge aspects of the presidential initiatives 
that assault entrenched constitutional understandings, forcing the po-
litical branches to refine their revolutionary proposals;217 in the mean-
time, the opposition Democrats will be given an opportunity, both in 
2006 and 2008, to appeal to the People to reject or to modify the basic 
premises of the President’s war on terror.218 
The jury is still out: after all, the Reagan presidency also signaled 
the need for fundamental change but ultimately failed to win the deci-
sive support of the American people,219 and we may see the same thing 
happen again.  But then again, we may not: the signal of 2004 may 
culminate in the ratification by the People of a fundamentally new con-
stitutional regime that moves far beyond the question of national secu-
rity to redefine a host of other principles and practices. 
We shall see. 
My point is that we do not see: America’s lawyers have blinded 
themselves to the most obvious realities that they confront as citizens 
— and only because the official canon, established by Article V, blink-
ers our vision of constitutional change and prevents us from expos- 
ing the present exercise in presidential leadership to disciplined legal 
analysis. 
I myself reject the very idea that we are fighting a “war on terror.”  
I believe that only tragedy awaits us if the American people endorse 
this pernicious notion.220  But my own opinion is one thing; constitu-
tional law is another — and as a lawyer I tell you that, if the move-
ment–Republican Party continues to win the Congress and the Presi-
dency through 2012, there will be a constitutional revolution in this 
country.221 
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 217 In both Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004), the Supreme Court has resisted the President’s aggressive assertions of power in the “war 
on terror,” but it is too soon to say how it will all turn out. 
 218 These Lectures were originally delivered in October of 2006.  See supra note 12. 
 219 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 390–92. 
 220 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006). 
 221 I describe the doctrinal revolution looming on the horizon in Bruce Ackerman, The Art of 
Stealth, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2005, at 3.  For a similar view, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
RADICALS IN ROBES (2005).  
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Even if the present exercise fails and the defenders of the estab-
lished order manage to beat back the challenge, no constitutional re-
gime lasts forever.  Sometime in the twenty-first century, a day will 
come when our representatives in Washington do manage to revolu-
tionize our constitutional ideals and practices.  The only question is 
whether change will come through top-down power plays, or through 
mobilized debate, institutional struggle, and self-conscious decision 
from below. 
The final answer will be in the hands of our fellow citizens.  But the 
stories lawyers tell about our constitutional development will make a 
difference — both in shaping the perceptions of judges, legislators, and 
Presidents, and in framing broader public understandings of democ-
ratic possibility.  We dishonor our fellow citizens when we tell them a 
tale that treats their parents and grandparents as if they were pygmies 
compared to the constitutional giants of the ever-receding past.  We 
should offer them instead a view of constitutional development that in-
vites them to follow in the footsteps of Franklin Roosevelt and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. — to dream their own Dreams and make their own 
New Deals, and to build a better America in the twenty-first century. 
Perhaps our children and grandchildren will be equal to this chal-
lenge; perhaps not.  But we will fail them if we falsify our rich heritage 
of self-government and leave behind a formalist parody. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
So: in the final analysis, is the living Constitution a machine or an 
organism? 
I’ve rejected the false dichotomy offered up by the party of Black 
and the party of Holmes.  But we are now in a position to break out of 
the current impasse and integrate organic and mechanical elements into 
a deeper form of understanding. 
Speaking broadly, the argument advanced in these Lectures is based 
on two organic developments — one in political consciousness, and the 
other in political institutions.  Consciousness is primary: over the 
course of the twentieth century, ordinary citizens have come to identify 
themselves as Americans first, and Texans second.  This transformation 
has given deeper meaning to institutional changes that have long since 
outstripped the expectations of the Founders — most notably, the rise 
of the presidency, supported by movements and parties, to a leadership 
position in the higher lawmaking system.222  The successes of Franklin 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 222 In a recent article, Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes rightly emphasize the need 
for constitutional theory to recognize the centrality of political parties in our system of government.  
They argue, again rightly, that this requires a revision of standard accounts of the separation of 
powers: the branches operate very differently depending on whether they are all controlled by the 
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Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson in gaining broad popular consent for 
decisive constitutional breakthroughs both reflected and reinforced the 
notion that We the People of the United States can express our consti-
tutional will through national institutions, and not only through the 
federalist system described by Article V.  These achievements of the 
modern presidency provide the crucial precedents framing the constitu-
tional meaning of the present era — in which George W. Bush is seek-
ing to win the decisive mandate from the People that eluded Ronald 
Reagan.  And they also serve as the springboard for moving beyond 
Justice Black’s mechanical Article V method of specifying acts of popu-
lar sovereignty to a more common law method of identifying the land-
mark statutes and superprecedents of the twentieth century that are 
deserving of canonical status. 
So an appreciation of the organic path of historical development is 
absolutely essential to an adequate understanding of the American 
Constitution as it moves forward into its third century.  But at the 
same time, I want to emphasize the enduring significance of Founding 
machinery in shaping the development of the living Constitution.  
Pride of place goes to the separation of powers, and especially to the 
Founding decision to stagger terms in office — two for the House, four 
for the President, six for the Senate, and life for the Supreme Court. 
This makes it almost impossible for a movement-party to gain con-
trol over all the levers of power at a single moment, and imposes a 
more deliberate pace on constitutional revision.  Though one or another 
leading institution may signal the rise of a new constitutional agenda, 
there will be at least one holdout controlled by the partisans of the old 
regime.  The point-counterpoint between the transformative and con-
servative branches frames the meaning of ongoing electoral combat — 
as each side urges the voters to oust its rivals from their positions of 
power on election day. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
same party.  See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2332–34, 2338–47 (2006).  My arguments here contribute three points to those 
made in their outstanding essay.  First, I emphasize how the dynamic movement from divided-
party to single-party control may be accompanied by a sustained debate over, and popular decision 
resolving, large matters of constitutional principle.  Second, this dynamic process of debate and 
decision differs significantly depending on the identity of the branch(es) that elaborate the rising 
movement-agenda and those leading the resistance.  Third, while Professors Levinson and Pildes 
emphasize that American political parties have historically differed in the degree of their ideologi-
cal coherence, see id. at 2332–38, they do not root these differences in the dynamics of the rise and 
fall of popular movements, or in the changing relationships of movements to political parties over 
time.  
  On a more fundamental level, my emphasis is on the dynamics of separation of powers over 
time, while Professors Levinson and Pildes focus on the way it operates at any single point in time.  
A satisfactory view should incorporate both diachronic and synchronic perspectives.  The break-
through essay by Professors Levinson and Pildes should be an essential reference point in future 
work.  
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This dynamic system of checks and balances places the burden of 
persuasion on the partisans of the new constitutional vision: they must 
keep winning elections long enough to gain control of all three 
branches in order to achieve a constitutional breakthrough in the form 
of landmark statutes and superprecedents.223 
I predict that the separation of powers will be the central mecha-
nism for constitutional transformation in the coming century.  Perhaps 
some accident of history may cause it to misfire; perhaps this will force 
the protagonists into a desperate effort to crank up the antiquated 
state-centered machinery of Article V.  Anything is possible — it hap-
pened during Republican Reconstruction in the nineteenth century, and 
it happened during the Progressive Era — but similar scenarios seem 
unlikely under twenty-first-century conditions. 
In contrast, the separation-of-powers machine remains deeply en-
trenched in current practice.  And, as history shows, it can play itself 
out in a host of different variations.  It is the business of constitutional 
law to analyze these variations with care.  These case studies provide 
crucial reference points for diagnosing the dynamics of the coming 
struggles to make new higher law in the name of the American people 
— allowing lawyers to assess, in a professionally disciplined fashion, 
when and whether a movement has managed to signal the need for its 
fellow Americans to take its constitutional agenda seriously, and how 
successful it has been in gaining broad and decisive support for its  
initiatives. 
History doesn’t repeat itself; but it is all we have, and it is a pre-
cious source of constitutional precedents that we can, in common law 
fashion, apply to our recent past and changing future.  Whatever sur-
prising variations are in store for us in the coming century, one thing is 
certain: all movements finally run out of steam, bringing an end to the 
sense of common enterprise that enables the President, Congress, and 
the Court to generate cycles of landmark statutes and superprecedents 
that endure over the generations.  As ordinary Americans turn away 
from high-energy politics, different parties will win control of different 
branches of government, with different visions of America’s future 
finding different champions in the House, Senate, and presidency.  At 
this point, the separation of powers makes it possible for the Supreme 
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 223 Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson also emphasize the importance of capturing all 
three branches of government — and holding them over a period of time — in their theory of doc-
trinal revolutions.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001).  Their work, however, does not distinguish be-
tween political parties in which movements play a major role, and political parties that are con-
trolled by the instrumental actions of less ideological politicians.  As a consequence, their theory of 
“partisan entrenchment” fails to recognize the decisive significance of those rare occasions when all 
three branches of government are dominated by a movement-party.  
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Court to remember the achievements of the recent past, and integrate 
them into our evolving constitutional legacy.224 
But there is nothing inevitable about this process.  The Court may 
instead choose to trivialize the recent past and mystify ancient wisdom: 
no machine can actually force judges to serve as the keepers of our col-
lective memory.  This is a task for ongoing legal reflection, engaged 
professional debate, and thoughtful judicial decision.  Even if the pro-
fession develops an adequate constitutional canon, this achievement 
will not suffice to sustain the Republic as it faces the shocks and sur-
prises of the twenty-first century.  If the future is anything like the past, 
there will be a need for constitutional renewal and revision — and it 
will be up to ordinary Americans to tell the difference between the 
demagogue and the statesman and to mobilize to set the government on 
a sound course. 
Nevertheless, for all its limitations, the professional updating of the 
canon will keep our constitutional conversation on the right track.  
With the aid of America’s lawyers, our fellow citizens will constantly 
be reminded that popular sovereignty has not suffered a mysterious 
death in modern times, but that the American people have remained an 
active force in governing their own affairs. 
And that, my friends, is the beginning of wisdom. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 224 For pathbreaking work exploring the political dynamics that control the degree of judicial 
independence within the system of separation of powers, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991); and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992). 
